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BEYOND MITIGATION: TOWARDS A THEORY
OF ALLOCUTION
Kimberly A. Thomas*
THE COURT: I don't think I have time to listen .... I am not going to
reexamine your guilt or innocence here. That is not the purpose of a sentence.
THE DEFENDANT: I did not have the chance to tell you ....
THE DEFENDANT: But, your Honor, listen to me-'
Should the court hear this defendant? Is the story of innocence relevant
at allocution-the defendant's opportunity to speak on his or her own
behalf at the sentencing hearing prior to the imposition of sentence? Or, is
the purpose of allocution something different, as the judge suggests? The
answers depend on articulating a coherent account of the historic practice of
allocution and its place within the modem criminal system, a task I take up
in this Article.
INTRODUCTION: WHY ALLOCUTION?
In law, especially criminal law, trials are held up as the main event-the
stage on which the legal drama plays itself out. In this imagined scenario,
two accounts of the alleged criminal offense are offered to the jury through
opening statements, testimony, and closing arguments by competent
counsel for each side. The fact-finder chooses the story that it finds to be
true, a verdict is rendered, and justice is done. Even if this ideal was ever
accurate,2 in the modem justice system, it is pure myth.
* Clinical Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. For helpful comments
on earlier drafts, I would like to thank Eve Brensike, Bridget McCormack, Jonathan Sacks,
Vivek Sankaran, David Santacroce, Jason Solomon, Frank Vandervort, and James Boyd
White, as well as participants in the Clinical Law Review writer's workshop, especially
Adele Bernhard, Lily Camet, Randy Hertz, and Mae C. Quinn. Additional thanks to Paul
Hunt, Matt Morris, and the editors of the Fordham Law Review, especially Charles Keeley,
for their able assistance and attention to detail.
1. United States v. Li, 115 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1997). The case name Li refers to
defendant Lu's daughter, who was also charged. See id. at 128.
2. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph: A History of Plea Bargaining in
America 1 (2003) (noting that, as early as the 1920s, commentators bemoaned the
"vanishing jury"); see also Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics 423 tbl.5.22 (2003) (showing the number and type of dispositions
in U.S. district courts from 1945 to 2003).
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Most criminal defendants never go to trial. 3 The overwhelming majority
of cases end in guilty pleas.4 This is true in state and federal courts, for
misdemeanors and felonies. 5 Of the cases that go to trial, at least a small
percentage are either stipulated or other perfunctory bench trials.6
Even in contested trials, the defendant takes the stand in his own defense
in only a fraction of cases.7 The defendant can choose whether or not to
testify. 8 He has the right to testify even against the advice of counsel.9
He' 0 is told, however, that his silence cannot be held against him. I I As a
3. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 2, at 457 tbl.5.57 (stating that of the
felony arrests in the seventy-five largest counties in the country, 3% of those convicted went
to trial; less than 0.5% of misdemeanor defendants arrested in these counties were convicted
at trial; and, of all arrests, only 1% were acquitted at trial).
4. See, e.g., id. (stating that of the felony arrests in the seventy-five largest counties in
the country, 3% of those convicted went to trial); id. (stating that less than 0.5% of
misdemeanor defendants arrested in these counties were convicted at trial); id. at 423
tbl.5.22 (showing that in 2003, of the 83,530 defendants in U.S. district court, 72,110 plead
guilty or nolo contendere, while only 3463 were either convicted or acquitted after trial).
5. See id. at 426-27 tbl.5.24 (showing the disposition of cases in U.S. district court by
offense).
6. See Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in
Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105
Colum. L. Rev. 959, 979 n.76 (2005) (quoting a defense attorney who conducted stipulated
trials to preserve issues litigated in a motion to suppress); Maurita Elaine Horn, Comment,
Confessional Stipulations: Protecting Waiver of Constitutional Rights, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev.
225, 239-40 (1994) (discussing some reasons defendants might use stipulated trials).
7. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 311, 329-30 (1991) (describing one study in Philadelphia
in the 1980s that found that 49% of felony defendants and 57% of misdemeanor defendants
chose not to testify); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal
Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1449, 1450 & n.3 (2005) (citing the Philadelphia study for
the proposition that only half of those defendants who go to trial testify).
8. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.2(a) (2004) (requiring that "[in a criminal
case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, ...
whether the client will testify").
9. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); United
States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the decision to testify is a
constitutional right, not a trial strategy decision that can be waived by counsel).
10. Throughout this Article, when describing a defendant, I use male pronouns and
adjectives. While there are a significant number of female defendants in the criminal justice
system, I assume a male defendant for convenience and in recognition that the majority of
criminal defendants are men.
11. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Juries are instructed that they
cannot hold the defendant's silence against him. See, e.g., 7th Cir. Fed. Crim. Jury Instr. 3.01
(West 1999) ("The [A] defendant has an absolute right not to testify. The fact that the [a]
defendant did not testify should not be considered by you in any way in arriving at your
verdict." (alterations in original)); Charges to Jury and Requests to Charge in a Criminal
Case in N.Y. § 4:74 (Howard G. Levanthal ed., 1988) ("As you may recall, the defendant did
not testify on his own behalf. I charge you that the fact that he did not testify is not a factor
from which any inference unfavorable to the defendant may be drawn."). To be sure, some
jurors, despite the constitutional basis and instruction, expect to hear the defendant's
testimony and hold it against a defendant who fails to testify. Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477, 1527 (1999) ("The jury
is apt to infer guilt from the defendant's failing to testify (and this, once again, regardless of
any limiting instructions).").
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matter of practice, many defense attorneys discourage their client from
testifying-particularly if he has a prior criminal record or his version of
events is, in the eyes of the attorney, implausible. 12 Finally, constraints on
the relevance of testimony might limit the defendant's ability to recount the
events as he sees them. 13 In the end, only a small percentage of persons
convicted of crimes will tell a judge or jury their story during a trial. 14
Most-however remorseful, justified, or angry-will not have a chance to
speak until the sentencing hearing. 15
The silencing of defendants serves to disproportionately quiet the voices
of the poor and people of color within the court system. The obstacles
preventing poor and minority litigants from "having their say" in court have
been thoroughly recognized. 16 The specific silencing of defendants within
the criminal system is one of the starkest examples of this reality. 17
Allocution matters because it is one place in the criminal process where
every convicted defendant has the chance to speak.
In this Article, I develop two, sometimes competing, theories of the
practice of allocution: mitigation and humanization. 18  Mitigation is
12. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1966) (discussing the course
of action if defense counsel cannot dissuade a possibly perjurious client from testifying). See
generally Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986); Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R.
3.3(a)(3) (2004) ("A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a
defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.").
13. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 402. Furthermore, the definition of an offense or
defense will limit the scope of relevant evidence. For example, a defendant might be limited
in testifying to (or discouraged by counsel from testifying to) precipitating events if these
events do not constitute an actual defense or if they merely explain the defendant's motive in
carrying out an offense. The defendant might state, for example, that he did not know what
he was doing when he burglarized a home because he was so high on PCP that he does not
remember anything.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Li, 115 F.3d 125, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1997) (reprinting an
exchange between a defendant and the court at allocution).
15. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L.J. 1097, 1152 (2001); Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury:
Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 Stan. L.
Rev. 1447, 1455 (1997) ("Until the sentencing phase-days, weeks, or even months into the
process-most capital defendants sit mute in the courtroom, each one a kind of
criminological Rorschach card onto which jurors may project their deepest fears and
anger.").
16. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of
Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533 (1992); see also Anthony V.
Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 659, 692 (1988) (noting the silencing of poor clients in the attorney-
client relationship).
17. See Natapoff, supra note 7, at 1450.
18. I use the term "humanization" both to incorporate the more widely used term
individualization and to convey meaning beyond individualization. The term is not meant to
suggest that defendants lack humanity. See, e.g., James M. Doyle, The Lawyer's Art:
"Representation" in Capital Cases, 8 Yale J.L. & Human. 417, 426 (1996) (using the term
"humanize" not as "the Orwellian insult to the defendants that it appears to be," but instead
to counter representations of the defendant that dehumanize him or convert his entire person
into the act of the offense); Haney, supra note 15, at 1451 (discussing dehumanization of the
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allocution's most obvious purpose. Simply put, the defendant has a chance
to say something to the judge that will lessen the sentence. A defendant
might admit his responsibility for an offense or give details about his
involvement that lessen his role.
Information that is considered mitigating varies from court to court and
from sentencing system to sentencing system. However, the facts
contemplated by sentencing guidelines and statutes show some agreement
about the type of information that is believed (at least by legislators) to be
mitigating. For example, a defendant's acceptance of his responsibility for
the offense 19 has repeatedly been recognized as a mitigating fact that could
be conveyed at allocution.
While an important thread in allocution theory, mitigation is not the only
possible rationale. Another persistent rationale for allocution-and for
sentencing hearings in general-is individualization or humanization of the
defendant. Each sentence given should be tailored to fit the defendant and
the offense. 20 The sentencing hearing, and the defendant's allocution in
particular, is an opportunity for the court to learn details about the person to
be sentenced. The court uses these nuances to impose a just sentence that is
appropriate to the particular defendant. At its most pronounced,
humanization has little in common with the traditional mitigation rationale.
Despite the unique role of allocution at criminal sentencing and the
practice's existence for over 300 years, 21 few scholars have systematically
studied the practice or examined the theoretical underpinnings of the
right.22  Courts also give short shrift to any inquiry into allocution's
function, even in cases in which distilling the underlying purpose of the
practice would guide the court's decision. Now, when sentencing law is
under increased scrutiny,23 we need to refocus attention on the purposes
underlying our sentencing practices.
In this Article, I begin to fill this gap by examining the practice of
allocution. In Part I, I examine the historical practice of allocution,
contemporary case law, and sentencing practice to inform the choice of
defendant as one way in which capital juries experience "moral disengagement" from the
significant decision to put someone to death).
19. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3El.I (2006) (allowing a decreased
sentence for "acceptance of responsibility").
20. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (describing a "prevalent
modem philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely
the crime"). The extent to which judges can or should be allowed to promote this goal,
especially when compared to achieving parity between people convicted of the same
statutory offense, is limited by the legislature's use of mandatory minimums, "three strikes"
laws, and mandatory sentencing guidelines.
21. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (stating that "[a]s early as 1689, it
was recognized that the court's failure to ask the defendant if he had anything to say before
sentence was imposed required reversal").
22. Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L. Rev. 115 (1944), which is often cited when
allocution is considered, is the main exception.
23. In particular, scrutiny increased following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). See infra Part I.C.
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allocution purposes. None of these clearly supplies a rationale for
allocution; instead, they could justify mitigation as easily as humanization.
In Part II, I examine the case for mitigation. While support for a mitigation
theory can be gleaned from common law and current case law, I ultimately
conclude that viewing mitigation as the purpose of allocution fails to take
into account the real experiences of defendants, who sometimes want to
convey alternative stories of mercy, innocence, and defiance. In Part III, I
explore the initial contours of a humanization theory of allocution and
discuss some possible benefits of this theory to the defendant. Specifically,
I argue that a humanization theory allows for a broader range of defendant
speech-potentially combating the loss of offender's voice in the criminal
justice system. Also, a humanization rationale could benefit the criminal
justice system and the public by improving the legitimacy and accuracy of
the sentencing process. In Part IV, I address some criticisms of a
humanization model-that it is inefficient and that it allows for increased
discrimination at sentencing. I also examine a few practical ramifications.
If a humanization theory of allocution was emphasized, two consequences
would result: One, defense attorneys would have an increased counseling
role at the sentencing stage, and two, harmless error review of the denial of
allocution would be inappropriate.
I. WHAT IS ALLOCUTION? THE PAST AND PRESENT OF ALLOCUTION
PRACTICE AND THE CONTEXT OF MODERN SENTENCING
A. Historical Development ofAllocution
The history of allocution does not clearly signal which direction the
modern practice should take, but it does give insight into the origins and
purposes of allocution.
1. Common Law Allocution
At common law, allocution was a right given largely to persons
convicted of capital felonies. 24 These defendants were neither entitled to
counsel nor able to testify on their own behalf at trial. 25 At sentencing, the
defendant was asked, "Do you know of any reason why judgment should
not be pronounced upon you?"2
6
24. See Barrett, supra note 22, at 117-19, 126-40 (discussing the offenses for which
allocution was granted in England and in the 1800s in the United States). In general,
allocution was given following capital felony trials, while some jurisdictions extended
allocution to other situations. See id.
25. See Green, 365 U.S. at 304. But see Barrett, supra note 22, at 122-23 (describing
Rex v. Royce, (1767) 98 Eng. Rep. 81 (K.B.), an early English allocution case, in which the
defendant appears to be represented).
26. Barrett, supra note 22, at 115; see also I J. Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the
Criminal Law 700 (2d ed. 1816) (stating that the defendant should be asked by the clerk, and
that the question was "indispensably necessary").
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The defendant could respond with a limited number of reasons:27 He or
she could raise pardon, 28 pregnancy, 29 insanity,30 misidentification, 31 or
benefit of the clergy.32 According to English commentators, the effect of a
successful allocution was that the entire proceeding would be "set aside." 33
Benefit of the clergy originated in the exemption of clergypersons from the
jurisdiction of the secular, criminal court under limited circumstances. 34
However, the practice was gradually extended to more people, including
laymen, especially those with status or education. 35 The right of allocution,
though not in the exact details established in England, was incorporated into
American criminal practice. 36 Instead of setting aside the entire case, for
example, most early American cases that reversed for a denial of allocution
merely ordered resentencing. 37
Early English and American scholars described the practice, but gave
little insight into why allocution was thought to be important. 38 From the
27. See Barrett, supra note 22, at 120 (stating that because of the severity of punishment,
and additional punishment sometimes meted out to a defendant's property or a defendant's
family, "[o]f necessity some palliatives to these severe judgments and their consequences
had to develop or be invented.").
28. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 1035, 1042-43 (3d ed.
1890); 1 Chitty, supra note 26, at 700; Barrett, supra note 22, at 117; see also 3 James
Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 38-41 (London, MacMillan
1883) (suggesting that pardons were sometimes available, sometimes for a fee, to those who
killed accidentally or in self-defense).
29. 4 Blackstone, supra note 28, at 1041-42; Barrett, supra note 22, at 121. The reprieve
for pregnancy only extended until the child was bom and may have been limited to the first
pregnancy only. Id. at 121 n.28.
30. Barrett, supra note 22, at 121 & n.29 (citing 1 Chitty, supra note 26, at 761).
31. Id. at 120, 121 & n.27 (citing 1 Chitty, supra note 26, at 698). Misidentification
meant that the person present before the court for sentencing was not the same person who
was convicted of the offense. See id. at 120.
32. Id. at 117; see also 4 Blackstone, supra note 28, at 1030-34; 1 Chitty, supra note 26,
at 700 (stating that if the offender "has nothing to urge in bar, he frequently addresses the
court in mitigation of his conduct, and desires their intercession with the king, or casts
himself upon their mercy").
33. Barrett, supra note 22, at 117 (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 376 n.8 (1769)). However, according to Blackstone, the defendant could
be indicted again. See id.
34. 4 Blackstone, supra note 28, at 1030. After being discharged from the sentence of
the secular court, the offender was "delivered over to the ordinary, to be dealt with according
to the ecclesiastical canons," where he was usually acquitted. Id. at 1032. The benefit of
clergy was generally allowed only in "petit treason and capital felonies." Id. at 1034.
35. See id. at 1031-33 (describing the development of the benefit of clergy); see also 1
Stephen, supra note 28, at 487 (stating that the benefit was extended first to those who could
read, then to everyone, but that the range of crimes to which it applied was constricted).
36. John H. Dawson, Jr., Note, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-Court Should
Afford Defendant a Personal Opportunity to Speak Before Sentence Is Pronounced, 6 Am.
U. L. Rev. 117, 118 (1957).
37. But see Barrett, supra note 22, at 126-27 (describing one of a small minority of
American cases in which a new trial was granted based on a denial of allocution).
38. See id. at 116-21 (describing discussions of allocution by John Frederick Archbold,
Blackstone, Chitty, Francis Wharton, and Joel Prentiss Bishop). But see 4 Blackstone, supra
note 28, at 1034. I do not dismiss the argument that allocution should be a robust practice
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list of permissible allocutions at English common law, I can glean a few
potential purposes. First, the practice was an opportunity to correct errors.
For example, a defendant could state at allocution that he was not the same
person who was convicted and that he should not be executed. 39 Second,
allocution could be viewed as a substitute for modem defenses, particularly
excuse defenses. Insanity is the most obvious example of this; the offender
could assert in his allocution a ground for relief from judgment that, in a
modem trial, would be a complete defense. Pardons, which may have been
granted in cases of accidental homicide or self-defense, 40 could be seen in
this light. An allocution requesting a pardon basically alleged that the
conviction was not deserved because the offender either did not satisfy all
the elements of the offense, as in an accident, or was justified in his
conduct, as in self-defense. If allocution, as a historical practice, was a
means to correct errors or allow for defenses not provided by law, the
practice might have little modem meaning given the advent of statutory and
common law defenses and other changes in criminal law and procedure.
2. Changes in Criminal Practice
Significant, and perhaps critical, differences exist between defendants of
a few hundred years ago and those today. Some suggest that we continue to
allocute merely out of habit and that the practice has little practical effect or
symbolic value. 41 Among other things, critics of allocution point to the
changes in criminal law and procedure since its origins.42 First, defendants
did not have the right to testify on their own behalf at trial as they do now.
At common law, the defendant's one opportunity to speak to the court came
at the sentencing phase.43 Second, many more offenses carried the death
penalty and the nature of capital sentencing has changed over time. Third,
at the time, a defendant did not have the right to assistance of counsel, so
because of its long pedigree and centrality to sentencing at common law; however, I hope to
investigate additional theories that give contour and depth to the practice.
39. See Barrett, supra note 22, at 120, 121 & n.27 (citing 1 Chitty, supra note 26, at
698); see also id. at 129, 130 & n.71 (describing Messner v. People, 45 N.Y. 1 (1871), an
1871 New York capital case, quoted as saying that allocution was a practice that "the
wisdom and experience of ages has found necessary for the protection of the innocent").
40. See 3 Stephen, supra note 28, at 38-41.
41. See Barrett, supra note 22, at 253-55.
42. See id.; see also Jonathan Scofield Marshall, Comment, Lights, Camera, Allocution:
Contemporary Relevance or Director's Dream, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 207, 221 (1987). But see
Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) ("[W]e are not unmindful of the relevant
major changes that have evolved in criminal procedure since the seventeenth century ....
But we see no reason why a procedural rule should be limited to the circumstances under
which it arose if reasons for the right it protects remain. None of these modem innovations
lessens the need for the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present to the court
his plea in mitigation.").
43. Green, 365 U.S. at 304; see also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971)
(stating that the defendant has a constitutional right to testify on his own behalf).
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any plea on his behalf at sentencing would have to come through the
offender himself."
The first major change since allocution's common law origins is that
defendants can now testify on their own behalf at trial. However, they
generally do not. Most significantly, the prevalence of plea bargains 45
means that fewer and fewer defendants ever have the chance to tell their
stories at trial. Defendants who plead guilty knowingly waive their trial
rights. However, defendants' decisions to plea often will not be based on a
desire to stay silent. More likely, defendants plea because of the strength of
the evidence against them, the risk of conviction of a more serious offense
if they do not, or incentives in the sentencing practice and structure. The
fact that many defendants plea and waive their right to testify at trial does
not require that they be heard elsewhere. It only shows that, as a practical
matter, the right to testify at trial has not drastically increased the number of
defendants that are heard prior to allocution.
Historically, because the punishment for most felonies was death,
allocution developed largely for use in capital cases. 46 In the early criminal
cases in the United States, courts protected allocution more jealously in
capital cases than in noncapital cases.47 However, the number and type of
offenses that carry the death penalty have significantly dwindled over
time.48  The capital sentencing hearing has also changed. The penalty
phase is now a bifurcated proceeding, where the jury, and not a judge, often
determines the sentence. 49 Defendants are now constitutionally entitled to
present mitigation evidence. 50 In contrast to the historical practice, some
capital defendants who allocute may be cross-examined or required to
swear to the content of their speech. 51
44. Green, 365 U.S. at 304.
45. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
46. See generally Barrett, supra note 22 (discussing which jurisdictions limited the right
of allocution to capital trials); see also Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing
for Felony, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 821 n.2 (1968) (stating that "[t]hroughout most of the
history of English criminal law after the time of Henry III, death was the mandatory
punishment for any felony, except petty larceny and mayhem").
47. Barrett, supra note 22, at 125-43 (describing the treatment of allocution in a number
of U.S. jurisdictions and noting that several, including Florida, Illinois, and New Mexico,
protected allocution only in capital trials). But see Sarah (A Slave) v. The State, 28 Ga. 576
(1859), an early capital case in Georgia in which a slave was convicted of attempting to
poison her owner's family and the court found that failure to allocute was not reversible
error, primarily, the court stated, because Sarah was represented by a lawyer.
48. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-93 (1976).
49. See Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 13-15 (1980); see
also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2002).
50. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); see also McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
51. This practice varies by jurisdiction. See, e.g., Joseph E. Wilhelm & Kelly L.
Culshaw, Ohio's Death Penalty Statute: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 63 Ohio St. L.J.
549, 576-77 (2002) (stating that the defendant can choose at the penalty phase, under Ohio's
sentencing scheme, whether to make a statement to the jury under oath, which is then subject
to cross-examination). See generally J. Thomas Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's Right to
Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitutional Mitigation,
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Third, unlike at common law, a person convicted of a criminal offense
has the benefit of counsel at sentencing. At this phase, an attorney for the
defendant may speak and present evidence or testimony on her client's
behalf. She can also try to correct errors in the presentence investigation or
sentencing guidelines determination or file a separate sentencing
memorandum. Finally, she can file post-sentencing motions to correct trial
or sentencing mistakes. At common law, the defendant had none of this
assistance. His primary avenue for these functions was allocution.
From this history, two approaches could be taken. The first is that
allocution should be protected because of its long pedigree. On the other
hand, limitations or exceptions to the practice could be advocated because
of the changed procedural and substantive protections offered to criminal
defendants. The question still remains: Why did courts give the "last
word" to defendants and do those concerns animate modem criminal
practice?
B. Modern Allocution Statute and Case Law
The treatment of allocution by state and federal statutes and courts offers
clues about the vigor with which the right of allocution is being enforced
and the reasons to allow or deny it. The picture that emerges is that
allocution is consistently provided for and protected, to varying degrees, by
statute and constitution; and when faced with close questions, or denial of
the ability to allocute, courts differ over the importance and purpose given
to the practice. Additionally, some courts and legislatures treat allocution at
a death penalty hearing differently from other criminal cases; I will briefly
examine this difference. I conclude that the extent of enforcement of the
right cannot be defined without first determining the underlying purpose of
allocution.
1. Protected by Statute and Constitution
Both statute and, to some extent, constitutional due process provisions
protect the practice of allocution. Many state and federal statutes explicitly
provide the right to allocution before a sentence is imposed. 52 In noncapital
cases, this testimony is almost always unswom and not subject to cross-
examination. 53 The statutory description of the topic of the defendant's
15 N.M. L. Rev. 41 (1985) (arguing that the defendant's allocution should not be subject to
impeachment by the prosecution); Caren Myers, Note, Encouraging Allocution at Capital
Sentencing: A Proposal for Use Immunity, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 787 (1997).
52. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii); see also Cal. Penal Code § 1200 (West
2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-102 (2006); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3422 (2000).
53. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 555 A.2d 846,
857-58 (Pa. 1989) (noting that allocution, as traditionally understood, did not allow for
cross-examination, but permitted it in the death penalty case before the court); see also
David J. Novak, Anatomy of a Federal Death Penalty Prosecution: A Primer for
Prosecutors, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 645, 673 n.183 (1999) (listing state courts that allow an
unsworn plea to a capital jury by a defendant). But see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381,
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allocution varies by state, but often refers to the ability to speak about
mitigating facts 54 and present himself to the court.55
The ability of a defendant to speak before sentencing may be protected
by the Due Process Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court has not clearly stated
whether the denial of allocution constitutes a federal due process
violation. 56 The federal courts of appeals are split on the issue, 57 as are the
federal district courts. 58 Several states have interpreted their constitutions
to provide an independent constitutional right to allocute59 or have
explicitly included allocution in their constitutions.60
When determining whether the defendant's statutory or constitutional
right to allocute has been denied, courts examine whether the defendant was
informed of his ability to allocute, whether he stated a desire to allocute, 61
391-92 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding no common law right to make an unsworn statement to a
capital jury).
54. See, e.g., Md. R. 4-342(f) (Allocution and information in mitigation) ("Before
imposing sentence, the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity, personally and
through counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of
punishment.").
55. See, e.g., Me. R. Crim. P. 32 (requiring the court to ask the defendant if he wishes
"to be heard").
56. See United States v. Hill, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) ("The failure of a trial court to
ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is
imposed is not of itself an error of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ of
habeas corpus. It is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional."). In Hill, the
defendant did not request the opportunity to make a statement. See also McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 218 & n.22 (1971), vacated sub nom., Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S.
941 (1972) (stating that the Court has not addressed whether a judge's refusal to allow a
convicted defendant to allocute is a constitutional violation).
57. Compare Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1525-26 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Sentencing
is a critical stage of the criminal process," and "the right of the defendant to personally
address the court ... is an essential element of criminal defense."), and United States v.
Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494 (11 th Cir. 1991) (same), and United States v. Moree, 928 F.2d 654,
656 (5th Cir. 1991), and Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 335-36 (4th Cir. 1978)
(stating that the refusal of a defendant's request for allocution constitutes a denial of due
process), with United States v. Li, 115 F.3d 125, 132-33 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that
allocution is "an 'absolute right' in the federal courts," but not a constitutional right), and
United States v. Coffey, 871 F.2d 39, 40 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that there was no
constitutional right), and United States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379, 1396 (5th Cir. 1989)
(stating that there was no constitutional violation when defendant did not request allocution),
and Lunz v. Henderson, 533 F.2d 1322, 1328 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding the court's denial of
defendant's request to speak, where the court found that the trial judge thought that the
defendant was attempting to interrupt sentencing by his request).
58. See, e.g., McKinney v. Delaware, No. CIV.A. 97-340, 2000 WL 1728276 (D. Del.
May 3, 2000) (stating that the denial of allocution would be a due process violation (citing
Boardman, 957 F.2d at 1526-27)).
59. State v. Chow, 883 P.2d 663, 668-69 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Schutter v.
Soong, 873 P.2d 66, 87 (Haw. 1994)); State v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261 (Or. 2000); Harvey v.
State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1081-82 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207
(Wyo. 1987)). But see, e.g., People v. Brown, 665 N.E.2d 1290, 1318 (Ill. 1996).
60. See R.I. Const. art. 1, § 10 (guaranteeing that a person accused of a crime "shall be at
liberty to speak for [himself]").
61. See, e.g., People v. Lucero, 3 P.3d 248 (Cal. 2000) (finding no due process violation
for failure of the sentencing court to sua sponte offer defendant right of allocution); State v.
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and what the defendant would have said. Further, even if the sentencer
does not invite the allocution, courts generally have found the right fulfilled
as long as the defendant is allowed to speak when he requests to do so.62
For the most part, courts have not given sustained attention to the values
implicit in the practice or the reasons why it should, or should not, be
protected. Courts consistently fail to discuss why the factors they cite-
such as the defendant's assertion of his right to allocute and the content of
his allocution-are relevant. The Supreme Court in Green v. United States
discussed two rights that the defendant has in allocution-loosely, the right
to speak for himself and the right to present mitigation.63 Yet, the Court
never addressed what happens when only one of these rights is implicated,
or when one could be fulfilled through other means. Subsequent federal
and state decisions include language supporting either a mitigation or a
humanization rationale, but do not delineate why this rationale should be
prioritized. In crafting the statutory protections for allocution, legislatures,
likewise, have not coherently articulated their rationale for allocution.64
2. Capital Cases
In capital cases, courts generally recognize the ability of defendants to
allocute and the historic origins of the right in capital cases. 65 However, the
Gervasi, 69 P.3d 1074 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the defendant's rights were
violated, under state rule of criminal procedure, when the court failed to give the defendant
an opportunity to speak at sentencing). There is also doubt over whether Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32 requires allocution at sentencing on a violation of probation. See
Coffey, 871 F.2d at 41 (finding that allocution is not required at violation re-sentencing under
the rule); United States v. Turner, 741 F.2d 696, 699 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that the right
must be given "when deferred sentence is imposed following a revocation of probation");
United States v. Core, 532 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1976) (stating that allocution was not required).
62. See, e.g., McKinney, 2000 WL 1728276, at *7-*9 (denying habeas relief based on a
denial of allocution when the defendant was given time to address the court, despite the
judge's failure to invite him to speak and pronouncement of the sentence he intended to
impose before the defendant started speaking).
63. See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) ("None of these modern
innovations lessens the need for the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present
to the court his plea in mitigation.").
64. States use different language to describe the defendant's ability to speak at
sentencing. Some states use the common law formulation. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-
3422 (1995) (instructing the court to ask "whether [the defendant] has any legal cause to
show why judgment should not be rendered"). Some specifically mention the ability to
present mitigation. See, e.g., W. Va. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(C) (telling the court to personally
address the defendant and "determine whether the defendant wishes to make a statement and
to present any information in mitigation of sentence"). Others articulate an ability "to be
heard." See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 972.14(2) (West 1998) (allowing the "defendant an
opportunity to make a statement with respect to any matter relevant to the sentence"); Me. R.
Crim. P. 32(a)(2).
65. United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 391-95 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that there is no
right under federal criminal procedure rules or common law to make an unswom statement
to the jury and that the rule is complied with when the defendant makes a statement to the
district court, even though sentence is already determined), abrogated on other grounds by
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000); see also id. at 394 (citing
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extent of allocution protection for capital defendants varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, despite the origins of the practice in capital cases
and the increased protection for allocution by early American courts. 66 For
example, in capital cases, courts have refused to allow the defendant to
make an unsworn statement to the jury67 or to make a statement to the jury
without being cross-examined. 68
Due to the severity of the punishment and the attendant heightened
procedural protections, the sentencing phase of death penalty cases has
received significantly more attention than noncapital cases. 69 The life
stories of defendants are most often told in the death penalty sentencing
phase. 70 Sentencing evidence is a significant portion of the preparation and
defense strategy.71 Thorough lawyers for persons facing capital charges
may spend weeks or months focused on this part of the trial.72 They also
invariably present evidence that seeks to both mitigate the defendant's
culpability 73 and humanize him in the eyes of the jury.74 These "life
stories" show the individual defendant's background and character traits.
Nonetheless, this complex and contextualized portrait of the defendant does
not, necessarily, demand that he speak on his own behalf.
conflicting state court cases on the extent of common law protection of unswom statements
by the defendant to a jury).
66. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Hall, 152 F.3d at 391-94.
68. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 555 A.2d 846, 857-58 (Pa. 1989).
69. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (stating that because
"the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment ... there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is
[appropriate]").
70. See Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 353, 353 & n.2, 367 (1996) (relaying conversations with death penalty defense
attorneys about narratives they construct about their clients).
71. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 320 (1983) ("Counsel's obligation to discover and
appropriately present all potentially beneficial mitigating evidence at the penalty phase
should influence everything the attorney does before and during trial .... "); see also Welsh
S. White, A Deadly Dilemma: Choices by Attorneys Representing "Innocent" Capital
Defendants, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 2001, 2009 (2004) ("For more than two decades, however,
experienced capital-defense attorneys have recognized that introducing mitigating evidence
explaining the defendant's background and history to the penalty jury is generally the best
way to dissuade the jury from imposing a death sentence.").
72. See, e.g., Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense
Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 329, 336 (1995) (reporting on the
time and expense of litigating a capital case at the guilt and sentencing phases). Many
attorneys defending clients facing the death penalty, however, do not have the expertise,
resources, or time necessary to mount a good, or even constitutionally adequate, mitigation
phase. See id.
73. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597 (1978) (stating the defendant's right to
present evidence supporting a lesser sentence).
74. See generally Sarat, supra note 70; see also Doyle, supra note 18; Goodpaster, supra
note 71, at 335 (stating that "portray[ing] the defendant as a human being" is part of an
effective defense in a capital case); Haney, supra note 15.
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In sum, the current treatment of allocution by the courts does little to
clarify the basis and extent of allocution's protection and fails to consider
carefully its purpose. Absent an understanding or discussion of why we
protect allocution, we will be left with the current hodgepodge of appellate
court opinions and unsatisfactory answers to the question of whether
allocution is protected and under what circumstances.
C. Changes in Current Sentencing Law and Practice
Allocution does not occur in a vacuum. The possible sentences and the
evidence that is relevant at sentencing are controlled by state statute and
court practice. These sentencing structures form the boundaries within
which allocution takes place.
Especially under federal and state sentencing guideline systems, the
words spoken at sentencing by counsel are hemmed in by statute and
constrained by rules about what facts in a person's life are relevant under a
particular jurisdictions' sentencing structure. For example, under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, the youthfulness of an offender is deemed generally
to be irrelevant. 75 In part, these limitations are based in notions of equal
protection and fair play.76 However, the mandatory guidelines also silence
relevant sentencing stories77 and constrain permissible mitigating evidence.
The result can be pro forma sentencing hearings. It is difficult to imagine
that any of us, however terrible our worst act, would want our life summed
up with, "Please sentence within the standard range, your Honor."
In Blakely v. Washington78 and United States v. Booker,79 the U.S.
Supreme Court shifted the national sentencing landscape. 80 On their face,
75. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5Hl.1 (2006); see also Michael Tonry,
The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 37, 51 (2005) (calling
factors such as this one "ethically relevant" and noting that constraining them does not agree
with our sense of what should be relevant); Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on
Women, Men, the Family, and the Community, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. 169, 169 (1996)
("There are two provisions in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ... that make no sense in
the real world: one dictates that sex-along with race, national origin, and other factors-is
not relevant to sentencing. The other asserts the 'general inappropriateness' of considering
'family ties and responsibilities' in determining the term of imprisonment.").
76. See Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing
Reforms Reduce Discrimination in Punishment?, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 781, 793 (1993)
(stating that support for sentencing guidelines from civil rights advocates and others was
based on the hope that they would reduce judicial ability to discriminate based on race).
77. Additionally, sentencing stories are limited by counsel's lack of preparation and
advocacy. See, e.g., John L. Carroll, The Defense Lawyer's Role in the Sentencing Process:
You've Got to Accentuate the Positive and Eliminate the Negative, 150 PLI/Crim. 199, 121-
22 (1989); Stanley J. Roszkowski, Sentencing Provisions and Considerations in the Federal
System, 13 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 621, 633-34 (1982) ("It has been my experience that the
sentencing phase of a criminal case is often the most neglected. All too often even excellent
criminal trial lawyers will perform admirably during pretrial preparation and the trial itself,
only to neglect the opportunity to present more fully the defendant's position at the time of
sentencing.").
78. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
79. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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these cases enforced a Sixth Amendment right to have every fact that
increases a sentence beyond a statutory maximum found by a jury using a
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.81 In practice, these cases, and the state
court cases interpreting them, have called into question decades of
formulaic sentencing guideline systems. 82 Even in those jurisdictions that
continue to abide by guidelines, or at least refer to them, the attention to
sentencing practice may make defense attorneys more willing to
aggressively pursue sentencing departures and may give judges pause
before mechanically imposing guideline sentences. 83 In sum, the shifting
landscape means that more is at stake during sentencing.84
The development of new sentencing structures requires a reexamination
of the goals of sentencing and of how the sentencing hearing effectuates
these aspirations. It requires new thinking about sentencing theory and
practice. The changes in sentencing law do not, explicitly, alter the rules or
purpose of allocution. Nor do they answer the question about what should
be accomplished through allocution. While a 300-year-old practice, 85
allocution is an area that has been largely ignored, even before the push to
determinate sentencing schemes. Perhaps it merited little attention under
sentencing systems which produced formulaic outcomes unrelated to the
80. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Examining the Blakely Earthquake and Its
Aftershocks, 16 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 307 (2004).
81. Booker, 543 U.S. at 232; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.
82. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. Several states have determined that their sentencing
systems are affected by the Court's Blakely ruling. See, e.g., Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713
(Colo. 2005) (en banc); State v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. 2005) (finding that it is
unconstitutional for the court to find that the defendant is not amenable to probation and
depart from a presumptively stayed sentence); State v. Natale, 878 A.2d 724 (N.J. 2005);
State v. Allen, 615 S.E.2d 256 (N.C. 2005); State v. Provost, 896 A.2d 55 (Vt. 2005). A
variety of remedies have been implemented, including making all or part of the state
guidelines advisory, see, e.g., State v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470 (Ohio 2006), and requiring
jury determination of sentencing facts that increase the statutory maximum, see, e.g., State v.
Schofield, 895 A.2d 927 (Me. 2005). The effect of these changes has been to open up the
range of possible sentences. Other states have determined that their sentencing structures do
not violate the Sixth Amendment because they do not mandate sentencing above a statutorily
defined maximum based on judge-found facts. See, e.g., State v. Stover, 104 P.3d 969 (Idaho
2005); State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Neb. 2005) (granting
departure in a child pornography case, based in part on 411 pages of sentencing evidence
submitted by the defense). The Bailey court commented in its memorandum and order, "The
Assistant Federal Public Defender asked me to impose a non-prison sentence on Bailey, a
fellow who possessed child pornography, in order to save the defendant's little girl. No
way, I thought, hell will freeze over before that happens. I next explain how hell froze
over." Id. at 1091.
84. Compare United States v. Lyons, 450 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming a sentence
of 180 months, where guidelines provided a range of seventy to eighty-seven months'
imprisonment), with Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Ranum, No. 04-CR-31
(E.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2005) (Adelman, J.) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (describing
the need for consideration of other sentencing directives after Booker and sentencing the
defendant to a year and a day, when his guideline range was thirty-seven to forty-six
months).
85. See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961).
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life circumstances of individual defendants. However, in light of the
increased importance of sentencing, allocution deserves a second look.
II. MITIGATION AND ITS LIMITS
A. A Mitigation Theory ofAllocution
Mitigation is a commonly cited purpose of allocution. 86 It is also,
perhaps, the most intuitively attractive rationale: Just before the judge
issues her sentence, the defendant has a chance to tell in his own words why
his sentence should be lessened. These stories implicate the defendant in
the offense, but detail why the punishment should be less severe. 87 These
stories may also, but do not need to, accept responsibility for the offense.
The common law practice of allocution 88 may be based in a theory of
mitigation:89 reasons why the trial court should view the offender as less
responsible for his acts or view the offense as less severe. 90 For example,
pardons could be seen as mitigation instead of as a substitute for
contemporary defenses. In particular, pardons granted in cases of
accidental homicide or self-defense killings9' functioned in modem eyes as
mitigating evidence. They allowed the defendant to explain at allocution
why the customary sentence was unduly harsh. Allowing excuses for
pregnancy and insanity suggests that the court understood that, under
limited circumstances, there were features of the accused's physical or
mental condition that justified a lesser punishment.
However, mitigation is not a required thread of these practices. 92 For
example, benefit of the clergy, which exempted certain persons from the
reach of the secular criminal court, could be seen as a jurisdictional defect.
This is an allocution that admits the elements of the offense, but denies the
court's authority over the defendant. 93 Nothing suggests the defendant is
unworthy of the judgment that would otherwise be imposed. Likewise,
86. See, e.g., State v. Bowen, 915 P.2d 120, 123 (Kan. 1996) (finding that the defendant
is denied the right of allocution if he is not asked "if he or she has any evidence to present in
mitigation of punishment"); In re Echeverria, 6 P.3d 573, 576 n.13 (Wash. 2000) (en banc)
(noting that, in general, "allocution is a statement in mitigation by a defendant to a
sentencing judge").
87. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 463-65 (5th Cir. 1998) (suggesting
that the defendant may have allocuted on the minor role he played in the offense, compared
to others, and that the court should have heard this allocution), abrogated by United States v.
Reyna, 358 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2004).
88. See supra Part I.A.1
89. See Francis Wharton, A Treatise on Criminal Pleading and Practice 636 (9th ed.
1889) (mentioning that allocution was made, in part, to "mitigate punishment").
90. The fit is not exact because originally, convicted defendants could either have
judgment entered or set aside. See Barrett, supra note 22, at 117. Strictly speaking, there
was no "lessening" of sentence.
91. See 3 Stephen, supra note 28, at 38.
92. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
93. See 4 Blackstone, supra note 28, at 1031 (describing the origins of benefit of clergy
as an exemption of clergy from the authority of the secular criminal court).
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insanity might not be viewed as "mitigation" in modem eyes, as it
eliminates the offender's criminal liability. 94
Modem cases support a mitigation theory as well. As an example, courts
that provide less protection for allocution in death penalty sentencings may
be operating implicitly on the assumption that the purpose of allocution is
mitigation. Using this assumption, they look to robust protection given to
the presentation of mitigating evidence at capital sentencing hearings. This
mitigation is usually conveyed to the sentencing judge or jury by
defendant's counsel. Then, in reviewing whether the defendant has the
right to allocute or the extent of such a right, courts may draw the
conclusion that the function of allocution has been adequately protected by
counsel's ability to present mitigation. Supporting this leap in reasoning is
the emphasis on appeal of the effective assistance of capital counsel in
presenting mitigating evidence. 95
As another example, some courts have focused explicitly on the content
of the defendant's possible statement at allocution and discussed whether it
would have made any difference. 96 The federal courts are mixed over
whether a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, the
protection for allocution of federal defendants, can be a harmless error.97
Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court suggested that a Rule 32 violation
would require remand and resentencing. 98 However, federal courts since
have read these violations as subject to harmless error and plain error
94. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 369 (4th ed. 2003).
95. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380-81 (2005) ("This case, like some
others recently, looks to norms of adequate investigation in preparing for the sentencing
phase of a capital trial, when defense counsel's job is to counter the State's evidence of
aggravated culpability with evidence in mitigation."). Conversely, decreased protection for
allocution in modem capital sentencing hearings is called into question if allocution is based
in a theory of humanization. Certainly, capital defense attorneys strive to humanize their
clients. See Doyle, supra note 18; Goodpaster, supra note 71, at 335; Sarat, supra note 70.
Yet, appellate review of their actions rarely recognizes this as a required function of counsel,
unlike mitigation. If allocution is based in humanization, the distinct treatment of the
allocution of capital defendants may not be tenable.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1503-04 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The denial
was not harmless because the district court had the discretion to sentence [the defendant] to a
shorter sentence."); Sellman v. State, 423 A.2d 974 (Md. 1981) (reversing and remanding for
resentencing after the defendant was denied a request to speak; and noting that the trial court
could decrease the defendant's sentence in response to the allocution).
97. Compare United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that
denial of allocution is not harmless error and that "remand is necessary even when the
judge's comments, at the sentencing hearing or elsewhere, indicate that the judge would
remain unmoved in the face of anything the defendant has to say"), and United States v.
Patterson, 128 F.3d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir. 1997) (requiring resentencing), and United States v.
De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1994) (same), with United States v. Riascos-
Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Leasure, 122 F.3d 837, 840-
41 (9th Cir. 1997), and United States v. Cole, 27 F.3d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1994), and
Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir. 1992), and Ashe v. North Carolina, 586
F.2d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1978). For state cases criticizing the application of harmless error,
see Mohn v. State, 584 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1978); People v. Emig, 493 P.2d 368, 369-70 (Colo.
1972); Tomlinson v. State, 647 P.2d 415 (N.M. 1982).
98. Van Hook v. United States, 365 U.S. 609 (1961).
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analysis. 99 Those courts that apply a harmless error standard consider what
the defendant would have said'00 and whether his sentence was high or low
compared with the guidelines or standards for that court. 101 These courts
seem more concerned with a mitigation rationale. They assume implicitly
that the crux of the allocution is the defendant's ability to give information
that will influence the sentence. 10 2 In this light, the mere use of a harmless
error-type analysis might signal more support for a mitigation theory of
allocution. This is tentative, though. There are other reasons unrelated to
the purpose of allocution-such as efficiency or conservation of
resources-that a court might prefer harmless error review.
Further, mitigation is consistent with at least some theories of
punishment and more pragmatic policy concerns. For example, the ability
to present mitigation at allocution dovetails with retributive theories. Put in
an oversimplified way, a defendant who is less blameworthy or whose
conduct is not as offensive deserves less punishment than someone who is
more blameworthy or whose crime was more serious. Allowing the
defendant to give this information to the judge lets her better determine a
fitting punishment. A mitigation purpose complements the policy goal of
accurate sentencing by permitting the offender to convey information to the
judge that is necessary to a correct sentencing under the jurisdiction's
sentencing system.
B. What If Nothing the Defendant Can Say Will Mitigate His Sentence?
Basing allocution on a theory of mitigation presupposes that the
allocution can matter. In fact, in a regime where sentencing judges have
discretion, even within guideline ranges, the information presented at
sentencing can often have a significant effect on the sentence imposed.
However, other sentencing laws significantly constrain or even eliminate
this discretion. Mandatory minimum sentences are the foremost example.
Included in these mandatory sentences are the many states that require life
imprisonment for persons convicted of some homicides and sexual assaults
99. See, e.g., United States v. Reyna, 358 F.3d 344, 347-53 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(rejecting prior automatic reversal and applying Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) plain error analysis to
denial of allocution-reasoning that the Court has applied Rule 52 harmless error and plain
error analysis without regard to the seriousness of the error and, therefore, a denial of
allocution under Rule 32 would also be subject to this analysis); Leasure, 122 F.3d at 840
(stating that the denial of Rule 32 allocution was subject to harmless error); Riascos-Suarez,
73 F.3d at 627 (same); Cole, 27 F.3d at 999 (same).
100. See United States v. Lewis, 10 F.3d 1086, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding a violation
of the federal court rule on allocution, but finding that the error was not prejudicial because
"[n]othing Dickerson might have said in allocution could have reduced his sentence, for he
received the shortest sentence allowed by statute"); see also Cole, 27 F.3d at 999 (finding
plain error and vacating sentence, where defendant did not address the court and "the
possibility remains that an exercise of the right of allocution could have led to a sentence less
than that received").
101. See Lewis, 10 F.3d at 1092.
102. See, e.g., Krahn v. Tahash, 274 Minn. 567, 567 (1966) (stating that it would be an
"empty gesture" to allow the defendant to speak after being sentenced).
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or third-strike offenses. 10 3 Also included are a significant number of drug
and weapons statutes that require a mandatory minimum penalty. 10 4 In
these cases, allocution cannot matter. 105
If mitigation is the core purpose of allocution, offenders facing
mandatory sentences have nothing to say. 10 6  If sentences cannot be
mitigated, the ability to allocute does not need to be protected for these
offenders. In practice, legislatures are not carving out exceptions to
allocution statutes based on whether a mandatory sentence will be imposed.
Mandatory minimums are the starkest example of sentences that call into
question the mitigation rationale, or perhaps the relevance of allocution
itself.
Further, the continued protection of allocution, despite the historic shift
to counsel for accused defendants, suggests that mitigation is not the core
purpose behind the modem practice. Competent defense counsel at
sentencing can effectively present mitigating facts on behalf of her client. 107
In fact, it is counsel's duty, 10 8 and she has a number of means available to
carry it out. To convey this mitigation to the court, defense counsel can call
witnesses for the defense, present documents or other exhibits, or make
representations about the client. If the purpose of allocution is limited to
mitigation, the defendant's speech is, at best, cumulative, because counsel
can fulfill this function. The defendant's ability to speak on his behalf and
express himself sincerely would not matter. Counsel's representations
could render the allocution a mere appendage-an historic anomaly with no
modem purpose. 109
103. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.316 (West 2004) (requiring mandatory life
without parole for first-degree murder).
104. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (imposing a mandatory consecutive sentence for
a person who "uses or carries a firearm" during a crime of violence or drug trafficking
offense); id. § 924(e) (requiring a minimum fifteen-year mandatory sentence for a gun
offense for certain repeat offenders); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1) (requiring mandatory
minimum sentences for certain drug trafficking offenses).
105. Cf State v. Ferman-Velasco, 41 P.3d 404, 410-12 (Or. 2002) (finding, in a state that
recognizes a constitutional right to allocution, no due process violation for imposition of a
mandatory minimum, and no right of the sentencing court to give a lesser sentence). I could
not find any systematic attempt to determine whether or not defendants facing mandatory
life imprisonment or other mandatory sentences exercise their ability to allocute.
106. Offenders facing lesser mandatory minimums may wish to allocute in mitigation,
because in some cases they will be eligible to receive a greater sentence than the mandatory
minimum and could allocute to "mitigate" their sentence to the least required by law.
107. At least two distinct sets of concerns are lumped into the term "competent" defense
counsel. First, there is the competence of counsel as an attorney, especially in light of
caseloads of public defenders and others that represent the bulk of criminal defendants. A
second concern is the ability of even capable attorneys to understand what is important
mitigation to their clients and to translate meaningfully the client's concerns into the
language of sentencing mitigation.
108. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523-25 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 395-96 (2000).
109. Couch v. United States, 235 F.2d 519, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (Miller & Bastian, J.J.,
concurring in affirmance and dissenting in part) ("We see no reason for the trial judge to ask
the defendant personally if he wishes to make a statement when a statement has already been
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Yet judges, scholars, and laypeople still expect to hear from the
defendant at sentencing. There is a sense that the defendant's own words
add "something" that cannot be otherwise conveyed by counsel.1 0 Even a
well-trained and prepared defense attorney will not necessarily be able to
convey the same points to the court that the defendant himself can.'11  The
attorney presents the desired evidence or testimony in a polished and legally
relevant way. But the convicted defendant could have a role to play. The
defendant is the owner of the allocution story and should ultimately control
the message conveyed to the court on his behalf. 112 This is especially
significant in the context of indigent criminal defendants who may
appropriately resent or disagree with the characterizations of their lives that
have been given by state authorities. 113 This is the "something" that gives
allocution modern relevance.
C. Non-mitigation Stories
Mitigation does not encompass all of the stories that have been, or could
be, told at allocution. Allocution stories never have been limited to the
presentation of information that lessens-i.e., mitigates-the defendants'
blameworthiness. Instead, defendants also have focused on stories of
mercy, innocence, and defiance. I examine these ways of allocuting and
question whether they ever should be included in allocution.
1. Mercy
At sentencing, many defendants want mercy. They have either been
found guilty or admitted their guilt of a criminal offense. They stand before
the sentencer, often with little to offer as an excuse for their conduct. They
hope for mercy, and allocution is their opportunity to ask for it.
Mercy could be seen as equivalent to mitigation. The defendant states
that for some reason he deserves to be punished less severely than he
made for him by his counsel and where the court is not advised by defendant or his counsel
that the defendant wishes to make a statement personally.").
110. See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (stating that defendant must be
given the right personally to speak, not through counsel); see also United States v. Myers,
150 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 1998) ("As the Supreme Court recognized, Rule 32 envisions a
personal colloquy between the sentencing judge and the defendant.").
111. See Green, 365 U.S. at 304 ("The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak
for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself.").
112. Cf Kathleen A. Sullivan, The Perils of Advocacy: Listening, Labeling,
Appropriating, in Hard Labor: Women and Work in the Post-Welfare Era 191, 199-203
(Joel F. Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999) (pointing out, in the context of mothers on
welfare, that these women's stories are misappropriated by the child welfare system and that
well-intentioned poverty lawyers may commit the same error by, for example, characterizing
the stories of their clients in ways that the clients themselves would not recognize or by
using, without the clients' input, the confidential and private information gained through
representation to tell a favorable story).
113. See id. at 199.
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otherwise would, and asks the judge to impose this merciful sentence.1 14
This view of mercy is consistent with a retributive purpose of punishment
because it argues that lessening of the sentencing is based on what the
defendant deserves. 115
Another view of mercy is that it is distinct from mitigating facts. 116
Here, mercy does not mean that the defendant deserves a lesser punishment.
Instead, mercy can be exercised without reason or cause.11 7 Under this
view, mercy does not rely on the accuracy of some fact about the offense or
the offender. 118  Instead, it relies on sympathy or empathy for the
defendant. 119 While not necessarily the dominant view of mercy, this
114. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in Character, Liberty,
and Law: Kantian Essays in Theory and Practice 59, 79-80 (1998) [hereinafter Murphy,
Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy] (suggesting two ways of looking at mercy under a
retributive justice paradigm); see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in Jeffrie
G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 162, 169-72 (1990) [hereinafter
Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice]. Murphy and others draw the distinction between mercy
that is deserved, which fits with a retributive justice system, and mercy that is not deserved,
which does not comport with retributive justice, because the offender is not receiving the
sentence he justly deserves; instead he is receiving a lesser sentence. See generally Martha
C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, in Punishment: A Philosophical & Public Affairs Reader
145 (1995).
115. See Murphy, Repentance, Punishment and Mercy, supra note 114, at 79-80.
116. See Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, supra note 114, at 172-73 (discussing mercy
that calls for lessening punishment beyond what is justly deserved, but rejecting it); see also
Nussbaum, supra note 114, at 163 (distinguishing particularity of justice-fine-tuning the
circumstances of the offense and offender to arrive at a just punishment-from mercy). But
see generally Sullivan, supra note 51 (discussing the ability to allocute in a capital
sentencing hearing and not making a distinction between appeals to mercy and mitigation
evidence). Sullivan argues that, in part because the defendant's allocution is a plea for
mercy and not a statement of contested facts, the allocution does not call for impeachment.
See id. at 63.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 981 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(stating that one key function of allocution is to allow the defendant "one more opportunity
before conviction 'to throw himself on the mercy of the court' (quoting United States v.
Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 1998)), abrogated by United States v. Reyna, 358 F.3d
344 (5th Cir. 2004). While this view of mercy is not consistent with retributive punishment,
in that the defendant receives a lesser sentence than he actually deserves, the analysis still
coincides with a retributive view, in that the desert of the defendant is viewed as a primary,
relevant consideration.
118. See, e.g., State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177, 216 (Wash. 1992) ("Allocution is a plea for
mercy; it is not intended to advance or dispute facts.").
119. See Haney, supra note 15, at 1453. Haney states,
The tendency to extend mercy to those with whom we feel kinship was recognized
in Thomas Green's study of jury nullification by thirteenth and fourteenth-century
English juries. [Green] observed that:
[T]he leniency accorded villagers by their neighbors may be put down to
favoritism, but given what jury behavior in homicide suggests, that may
be just another way of saying that jurors thought the rules too harsh when
forced to apply them to persons whom they knew well enough to identify
with.
Id. (quoting Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the
English Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800, at 63 (1985)).
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definition holds sway with the public and is rooted in our cultural
understanding. 120
The possibility of mercy, detached from mitigating facts, and the ability
of defendants to appeal to mercy, adds something valuable to criminal
sentencing. As an initial matter, defendants 21-and their lawyers 122-
make this appeal. In death penalty cases, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged this possibility of mercy and has distinguished an instruction
on "sympathy" from the requirement that the jury consider mitigating
evidence about the offense and offender. 123 This view of mercy, detached
from the desert of the defendant, is desirable. Allowing for the possibility
of this kind of mercy reinforces the individuality of both the defendant and
the sentencer. Allowing the defendant to appeal directly to the judge or jury
for mercy affirms the ability of the sentencer to exercise discretion in a wise
and humane way. 124
2. Innocence
Innocence stories could be viewed as an extreme version of mitigation:
the defendant's plea that his lack of culpability merits the minimal sentence.
If seen in this way, defendants' stories about innocence fit within
allocution, even if the purpose is limited to mitigation.
Courts do not want to hear allocution stories of innocence. 125 Most
judges assume, often consistent with the evidence they have heard, that the
person before them actually has committed the offense and any innocence
tale is fiction. These defendants risk and receive harsher sentences because
of their perceived failure to accept responsibility, lack of candor with the
court, or failure to acknowledge the validity of the fact-finder's decision. 126
120. Robert L. Misner, A Strategy for Mercy, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1303, 1306 (2000)
(noting the prominence of mercy in religion, literature, and philosophy).
121. See, e.g., State v. Keyser, No. 238 2005, 2005 WL 1331778, at *11-*12 (Del. Super.
Ct. June 3, 2005) (weighing, among other factors in its decision to impose a life sentence
instead of the death penalty recommended by the jury, the defendant's plea for mercy during
his allocution).
122. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Mercy Lawyers, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1297, 1297 (2003)
(describing attorneys who defend prisoners and death-row inmates at clemency as "mercy
lawyers").
123. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987).
124. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 114, at 164-65 (discussing Seneca's original
concept of mercy and asserting that "in the end his position is clearly that it is right and
correct to assign punishments in accordance with mercy, both because of what it means for
oneself and because of what is says about and to the offender").
125. See, e.g., Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 658 (Del. 2001). Capano quoted the trial
court's statement to the jury, after the defendant's allocution, as follows:
Members of the jury, as I indicated before Mr. Capano started his allocution, it's
limited to a very narrow framework, specifically the defendant is not permitted to
rebut any facts or to deny his guilt or to voice an expression that contradicts the
evidentiary facts that you heard in the trial.
Id.
126. See Martha Grace Duncan, "So Young and So Untender": Remorseless Children
and the Expectations of the Law, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1469, 1471 (2002). Duncan criticizes
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If judges were to believe innocence stories, a fundamental mistake has been
made. How should a judge impose a just sentence upon someone who, if
believed, committed no offense? Whether the innocence allocution is the
truth or a lie, the court will not see this allocution as useful to sentencing.
The offender is making a statement that either aggravates the situation or, at
best, calls into question the entire process. Innocence stories may not often
be an appropriate use of allocution from the point of view of an efficient or
even just system.
Set aside for a moment whether the defendant should be able to tell a
false story of innocence. On occasion, an innocence story is true. 127 Every
so often, a defendant who asserts his innocence is, in fact, innocent.
Despite the disruptive effect on the process, there are significant reasons to
think that allocution should allow for the telling of a true innocence story.
Allocution will, except for post-sentencing motions and appeals, be one of
the last chances to question or correct an improper conviction. This is very
similar to the function that allocution served at common law: an
opportunity for the defendant to state any reason why the judgment should
not be imposed. Once the sentencing is final, deference will be given to
this judgment by an appellate process concerned with, among other things,
competence and finality. If there is any chance that a mistake can be
discovered without a costly and time-consuming appellate process, the
opportunity should be taken. Although increased protections for defendants
since allocution's common law origins-including the protection of
competent counsel, defendant testimony, and posttrial motions-suggest
that this "total mitigation" evidence would be true in even fewer cases now
than before, it still does not account for the percentage of cases in which it
would be accurate. This possibility of truth suggests that a theory of
allocution should provide an account of the practice that would allow the
telling of innocence stories.
Mitigation does not wholly satisfy this need. Neither does punting to the
availability of post-conviction processes that allow defendants and their
attorneys to raise issues of innocence. 128 Something is lacking. What is
courts' assessment of the perceived lack of remorse, particularly in juveniles accused of
crimes, and the frequent conclusion that courts can predict future criminal behavior from a
lack of remorse. See id. For an example of a defendant receiving a harsher sentence based in
the defendant's "protestations of innocence," see United States v. Li, 115 F.3d 125, 135 (2d
Cir. 1997). Note that the district court stated that, while the defendant's sentence could be
increased based on these words, she had the right to say them. See id. ("In this instance the
district court recognized Lu's 'perfect right to her protestations of innocence."').
127. For example, there have been "192 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the United
States." Innocence Project, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Facts on Post-Conviction
DNA Exoneration (2007), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/DNA
ExonerationFactsWEB.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2007); see also Samuel R. Gross et al.,
Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 523,
524, 531 (2005) (finding 340 exonerations and noting that these are just "the tip of an
iceberg" because of the difficulty of proving innocence in cases that do not involve DNA).
128. In addition to raising claims of sufficiency of the evidence or errors on direct appeal,
the Court has assumed that a habeas corpus claim could lie-under an unspecified
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missing is the opportunity-in the unusual case in which an innocent person
is convicted-for the convicted person to be able to stand up in open court
and to say so. This declaration of innocence will be noted if the defendant
later pursues an appeal. 129 The ability of innocent defendants to speak, in
person, to the court also encourages the court to perceive the possibility of
wrongful conviction and impress upon the court the importance of careful
practice. For the minority of defendants who are convicted but factually
innocent, if they wish to express themselves, they should be allowed to give
an allocution based in innocence.
3. Defiance
Convicted defendants tell allocution stories of defiance. These stories are
about refusal to submit to authority.130  Or self-definition. Or
righteousness. 131
Like innocence, these are stories that judges do not want to hear. Judges,
to the extent that they have preferences for certain allocution stories, value
standard-for a persuasive showing of actual innocence in a capital case. See House v. Bell,
126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006).
129. See, for example, the case of Eddie Joe Lloyd. Innocence Project, Know the Cases:
Eddie Joe Lloyd, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/201.php (last visited Feb. 19,
2007) (recounting the innocence allocution of Eddie Joe Lloyd, who was exonerated of
murder by DNA evidence after serving seventeen years of a life sentence). According to the
Innocence Project, at allocution Lloyd stated,
Into each life tears must fall. That means on both sides. MJ [the victim] had a
right to live, as we all do... . [S]he said goodbye ... and disappeared in the
darkness never to be seen again alive. One day later she was found in a vacant
garage. Cold, alone, and lifeless... . Eddie Lloyd was focused on as a suspect
while he was a mental patient and somewhere along the line was he was [sic]
charged and convicted of the crime, a heinous crime, brutal. What I want to say to
the court is that, to the family, MJ, to the city of Detroit, to everybody who was
involved with the case, I did not kill MJ. I never killed anybody in my life and I
wouldn't.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. See, e.g., Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, United States v. Dellinger, No. 69 CR
180 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 1970), available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/
Chicago7/Sentencing.html (transcription of the allocutions of the "Chicago Seven"
defendants, in which they criticize the court process, the judge, and the actions of the country
that convicted them, as well as recommend LSD to the presiding judge).
131. One of the more famous examples of an allocution in this vein was the one given by
John Brown, before he was sentenced to death on November 2, 1859. See Rachel F. Moran,
Race, Representation, and Remembering, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1513, 1531 (2002) (discussing
Brown's case and noting that "[flrom the beginning, Brown understood the importance of
using the courtroom as the platform for the righteousness of his cause, rather than the
wrongness of his acts. He converted his prosecution into the site for a counternarrative about
himself as well as the process used against him"). Brown stated,
I believe that to have interfered as I have done, as I have always freely admitted I
have done, in behalf of His despised poor, I did no wrong, but right. Now, if it is
deemed necessary that I should forfeit my life for the furtherance of the ends of
justice, and mingle my blood further with the blood of my children and with the
blood of millions in this slave country whose rights are disregarded by wicked,
cruel, and unjust enactments, I say let it be done.
Jules Abels, Man on Fire: John Brown and the Cause of Liberty 330-31 (1971).
20071 2663
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
repentance, acceptance, and remorse; not admission and defiance. Defiance
stories do not deny commission of the criminal act, but do not apologize.
Instead, they challenge the authority of the court, the state, or the law under
which defendants were convicted. 132 There is no apology and no remorse.
Legislators also disfavor defiance allocution stories. Instead, under
legislative guidelines, defendants receive more lenient sentencing for
"acceptance of responsibility,"' 133 amenability to treatment, and other
factors that suggest a docile, compliant, and penitent offender. As a result,
many defense lawyers, especially outside the context of overtly political
trials, understandably discourage their clients from telling defiance stories.
These tales challenge, or at least defy, a system-a system in which the
judge and, to some extent, the attorney, are invested participants.
A defense attorney rarely is in a position to adequately convey her
client's defiance story. Foremost is the ethical and professional tension
between expressing the client's wishes and attempting to minimize the
harm, in the form of incarceration, that is given to the client. 134 The
balance struck by any one lawyer often will depend on factors outside the
scope of the client's wishes, such as the attorney's perception of the client's
competence or impairment, the degree of harm that the client will suffer, the
sentencing court's likely reaction to a defiance story, or the amount of
preparation time that the lawyer can spend with the client. This dilemma
assumes the client will have conveyed his desire to portray himself in this
way to his lawyer and his lawyer, in turn, understands the defiance story.
This assumption often will be untrue. The defense counsel may not
dedicate the time or have the skills needed for the client to share this
priority. 135 Even a dedicated attorney may not understand the client's
goals, perhaps because of barriers of class, race, language, or life
132. See, e.g., Michael S. Lief & H. Mitchell Caldwell, And the Walls Came Tumbling
Down: Closing Arguments That Changed the Way We Live-From Protecting Free Speech
to Winning Women's Suffrage to Defending the Right to Die 199-202 (2004) (describing the
allocution of Susan B. Anthony after her conviction for voting in a presidential election, in
which she expressed her views on the legal system and the government and stated she never
would pay the fine imposed on her).
133. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1l (2006).
134. Cf Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's
Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1581 (2000)
(discussing this dilemma in the context of representing clients with mental disabilities);
Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness, 68 U. Cinn. L. Rev.
763, 763 (2000) (discussing this tension in the context of making "strategic" trial decisions).
135. See Marcus T. Boccaccini, Jennifer L. Boothby & Stanley L. Brodsky, Client-
Relations Skills in Effective Lawyering: Attitudes of Criminal Defense Attorneys and
Experienced Clients, 26 Law & Psychol. Rev. 97, 102 (2002) (citing previous studies that
reported criminal defendants were more likely to trust attorneys who "show concern for their
interests by keeping them informed about their cases, listening to what they have to say, and
spending time with them before court," but that many defense attorneys did not develop or
use skills to build client trust).
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experience. 136 Counsel may understand, but believe her client's autonomy
is violated if she expresses the client's story in her lawyerly and stilted
language. 137 Finally, the lawyer may herself believe that the client's
defiance story is inappropriate or offensive, and the lawyer may act based
on her own moral judgment. 138
These stories do not fit within a mitigation tradition. They almost
universally will not decrease a defendant's sentence. They often admit
culpability and explain why the actions or conduct was justified or
appropriate under the circumstances. Embracing a mitigation rationale
suggests that these stories need not be heard.
Perhaps that is true. Maybe we should understand the legislative
preferences for cooperative and repentant behavior as an expression of our
social judgment about the dialogue that should take place at sentencing.
Judges are given discretion at sentencing based on, among other things,
their ability to hear individualized facts about each offender and make a
determination about the appropriate penalty for each one. Further, people
directly affected by the offender's conduct do not want to hear defiance
stories. Perhaps these stories, however compelling or moving, should not
be told.
Yet, the telling of at least a few of these stories seems necessary. Before
being sentenced to life imprisonment, Nelson Mandela stood, dignified,
before his sentencing court and elegantly stated that he did the acts for
which he was convicted and was proud to have done them.139 Mandela did
not seek to mitigate his punishment or apologize for his conduct. 140 He also
suggested an alternative vision of justice in the face of what he believed to
be an unjust system. 14 1 His words flew in the face of the sentencing court
136. Daniel W. Stiller, Guideline Sentencing: Deepening the Distrust Between Federal
Defendant and Federal Defender, 11 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 304, 304 (1999) (reviewing a number
of reasons for distrust between a defendant and his attorney).
137. See, e.g., Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 130 (transcription of
sentencing hearing of the Chicago Seven defendants, in which their attorneys declined to
speak, instead allowing only their clients to speak for themselves).
138. Cf C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics of
Death Row Volunteering, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 849 (2000) (discussing ethical and moral
tensions between capital defense attorney and clients who express a desire to receive the
death penalty).
139. See James Boyd White, Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in Literature, Law, and
Politics 277 (1994) ("Nelson Mandela denies the authority of the sabotage law under which
he is convicted, and in doing so creates another vision of the world and himself, in his own
text, for which he claims an authority that will justify the acts of sabotage he admits he has
committed ... "). White reproduces the allocution from a number of sources.
140. See id. at 279 ("An essential part of the meaning of this speech, like the speeches of
Socrates to the jury, is its refusal to seek clemency. There is no apology here in the modem
sense of the term, but in an older sense the speech is indeed an apology: it is a justification
of his life, an insistence on saying the truth about his motives and his methods, on this last
occasion on which he could expect to speak in public in his lifetime."). White notes that
Mandela's education and training allows him effectively to present this defiance story, at
times assuming the persona of an objective lawyer. Id.
141. Id. at 288-94.
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and questioned the legitimacy of his prosecution. It was a true defiance
story. Though offensive to the sentencing court and the system that
convicted him, Mandela's words and actions-including his allocution-
are now held up as an example of courage. It is not just a permissible
allocution; it is a heroic one. He should not have been silenced.
One objection to discussing Mandela's case is that it is atypical.
Mandela was a trained attorney pursuing political goals against an
oppressive government. 42 What does the allocution of Nelson Mandela
have to do with the often inelegant ramblings of the average defendant in
the United States; someone not pursuing a political ideal; someone merely
guilty of committing a criminal offense? My point in using Mandela's
allocution is not to suggest that others will be as eloquent or that their goals
will be as just. It is merely to point out the limits of a mitigation rationale
for allocution.
This is an area where purpose matters. If allocution serves mitigation
only, then stories of defiance have no place within modern practice. 143
These defendants do not have an ability to speak. If we think, as I do, that
these stories-stories that might offer alternative accounts of the case or the
offender, including stories of racism in the criminal justice system,
economic oppression of the defendant, or other counter-hegemonic
themes-have a place, then we must look beyond mitigation to understand
allocution.
11. THE CASE FOR HUMANIZATION
A. A Humanization Theory ofAllocution
If allocutions focused on mitigation can be futile, inflexible, and flawed,
humanization provides an alternative perspective. Allocutions that are
rooted in humanization allow for a broader scope of defendant speech,
accommodate the defendant's unique perspective, and dovetail with the
participatory sentencing advanced in the context of victims' rights.
1. Humanization Allows for a Broader Scope of Defendant Speech
Humanization takes the individualization of the defendant as its starting
point. The allocution allows a defendant to describe who he is, how he
came to this place in his life, and what he hopes for his future. Allocutions
based in humanization can also focus on themes of innocence, mercy, 144 or
142. White notes that even in apartheid-era South Africa, where silence would likely have
better served the goals of the government, Mandela was permitted to speak. Id. at 293.
143. Technically, Mandela's allocution could matter, as he did not know his sentence and
was eligible to receive the death penalty. See id. at 278-79. However, mitigation of his
sentence was clearly not the central purpose of his allocution.
144. See United States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating
allocution is meant to "temper punishment with mercy in appropriate cases, and to ensure
that sentencing reflects individualized circumstances").
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defiance. For the defendant, who has already been convicted, his interests
may be broader than just a decreased sentence. To be sure, many, if not
most, defendants will want to achieve a lesser sentence and will speak at
allocution about mitigating facts. They may also, however, want to speak
their mind, highlight an element of the offense or trial that appears to them
as unjust, or pursue other goals unrelated to the lesser sentence. It is these
ends that are allowed under a humanization rationale. In other words,
humanization allows for a wider variety of stories and voices and
legitimizes and values a broader range of speech.
The humanization rationale can be found in both the history of allocution
and modem case law. Common law rites of allocution could be viewed as
an attempt, in a highly standardized system of automatic punishment, to
more closely match the culpability or character of the defendant to be
sentenced. The defendant had a chance to speak to the court directly and
personally offer his or her own explanation. 145 For example, at the point
when the benefit of the clergy had widespread availability, this plea in
allocution served the function of allowing the court to express mercy based
on the individual circumstances of the offender or the case. 146 To be sure,
this fit for a humanization theory is imperfect. The court had only two
options: impose a capital sentence or free the defendant. Allocution pleas
that did not fit into a recognized exception to imposition of the judgment
largely fell on deaf ears. Yet, the common law courts persisted in allowing
the defendant to speak.
In modem cases, courts that focus on the individualized presentation of
the defendant tend more towards a humanization rationale for allocution.
For example, in Harris v. State,147 the Maryland Court of Appeals
emphasized that the nature of allocution goes beyond mitigation. 148 "[T]he
allocutory process provides a unique opportunity for the defendant himself
to face the sentencing body, without subjecting himself to cross-
examination, and to explain in his own words the circumstances of the
crime and his feelings regarding his conduct, culpability, and
sentencing."' 149
145. See Wharton, supra note 89, at 636 (stating that "[t]he object of the address is to give
the defendant the opportunity to personally lay before the court, statements which, by the
strict rules of law, could not have been admitted... ; but which, when thus informally
offered from man to man, may be used to extenuate guilt and to mitigate punishment").
146. See 4 Blackstone, supra note 28, at 1034 (noting "the wisdom of the English
legislature having, in the course of a long and laborious process, extracted by a noble
alchemy rich medicines out of poisonous ingredients; and converted, by gradual mutations,
what was at first an unreasonable exemption of particular popish ecclesiastics, into a
merciful mitigation of the general law, with respect to capital punishment."); see also
Barrett, supra note 22, at 120 (suggesting that common law courts had to invent ways to
avoid the severe punishments of the day).
147. 509 A.2d 120 (Md. 1986) (applying the common law to uphold the right of
allocution to a capital defendant).




This broader content of appropriate allocutions does not necessarily
mean that defendants will speak more often. For example, there are many
places throughout the arrest and trial that defendants and their attorneys
make strategic choices not to talk, often prompted by structural and
procedural factors.150 But there are reasons to think it might help. For
example, a defendant might care about how he ended up in this place before
the court, the effect of the offense and criminal justice process on him and
his perceptions of this process, and how he perceives this incident in
relation to the rest of his life. 151 These topics do not fit squarely within a
mitigation tradition. With humanization, the picture that the defendant
wants to present of himself is more likely within the purpose of allocution.
This broader scope of speech may have structural implications beyond
simply more defendant speech. It is no secret who is not being heard under
an alternate theory of allocution. The silencing of convicted defendants is,
in large part, the failure to hear the stories of poor people, 152 often
disproportionately African American or Hispanic men. 153
Defendants, especially poor or minority defendants, might choose not to
speak for many reasons. Some of these reasons would not be altered by a
humanization theory of allocution. For example, defendants who do not
allocute because they are afraid of public speaking, self-conscious about
speaking patterns, or intimidated by the court or the sentencing process will
continue to be silent. However, some defendants may not speak, or may
constrain what they say, because of the content of their desired allocution.
They may believe that their personal story is one that does not fit within the
framework of mitigation. It is these allocutions which will be affected by
adopting a humanization rationale.
2. Humanization Is Less Concerned with Objective Fact-Finding
In addition to allowing a broader range of speech, a humanization
rationale places less focus on fact-finding. A humanization rationale
recognizes, consistent with real-world experience, that the defendant's
150. See Natapoff, supra note 7, at 1458-69.
151. See United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[Tlhe District Court
was likewise denied the opportunity to take into consideration [the defendant's] unique
perspective on the circumstances relevant to his sentence, delivered by his own voice.").
152. See Caroline Wolf Harlow, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special
Report: Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases 1 (Nov. 2000) (stating that about 66% of felony
defendants in federal court had court-funded counsel at the end of their case and about 82%
of felony defendants in large state courts had court-funded counsel).
153. Compare Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 2, at 454 (stating that of felony
defendants in the seventy-five largest counties, 45% were Black, 23% were Hispanic, and
81% were male), and id. at 432 (stating that of the offenders sentenced in U.S. district court
under the federal sentencing guidelines, 24.6% were Black, 41% were Hispanic, and overall,
86% were male), with U.S. Census Bureau, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin 2000, at
3 tbl.1 (2001) (stating that 12.3% of the population is Black or African American and 12.5%
of the population is Hispanic or Latino).
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allocution may not be verifiably true or false.154 Sometimes, the allocution
consists of the offender's perspective on his life and the offense of
conviction. For example, one defendant might experience his case as about
overreaching police or lying complainants, while others looking at the same
case do not see these themes. 155 Humanization allows for this subjective
interpretation.156
Other possible features of an allocution-such as the expression of
remorse-are rarely objectively determined to be sincere or insincere;
remorse or apology is not at its core a fact-finding question.' 57 Further,
defendants' stories, with high ideals of innocence, mercy, or defiance, will
sometimes be untrue. The defendant will not be innocent 158 or, to some,
worthy of mercy. Some judges may assume-correctly or not-that the
defendant's tale is a falsehood or an excuse. A theory of allocution should
at least consider these possibilities. Humanization does this by focusing on
the expression of the individual and putting less emphasis on determining
the truth or falsehood of a defendant's statement. This is consistent with
the difficulty of determining the "objective truth" of some possible
allocutions. Further, it is consistent with the practice of allocution that
requires the sentencer to hear out the defendant, but does not usually
require the sentencer to lessen the punishment based on the statements at
allocution, even if the defendant speaks about mitigating facts.
Some might view this decreased focus on fact-finding as a detrimental
feature. The sentencing hearing certainly can be viewed-and is viewed-
as an adversarial, fact-finding proceeding: The defense presents
information favorable to the defendant; the prosecutor presents information
unfavorable to the defendant; and the judge decides. Mitigation, arguably,
fits better into this adversarial model. A mitigation rationale suggests that
the judge can discover a discrete set of facts told by the defendant that can
lessen the sentence given. However, this fact-finding function of the
154. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 450 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Underlying the question of guilt or innocence is an objective truth .... The sentencer's
function is not to discover a fact, but to mete out just deserts as he sees them.").
155. Cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). In Coleman, each opinion viewed
the case to be decided in a different way, with a different story and themes. Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, characterized the case as one about federalism. See
id. at 726. Justice Byron White, concurring, focused on the procedural posture of the case.
Id. at 757-58 (White, J., concurring). Finally, Justice Harry Blackmun, in dissent, focused
on a story about liberty and fairness. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Sentencing 18-5.17 cmt. at 208 (3d ed.
1994) ("The policy behind the right of allocution has more to do with maximizing the
perceived equity of the process than with conveying information on which courts may rely in
making findings of fact.").
157. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into
Criminal Procedure, 114 Yale L.J. 85, 143 (2004) (asserting that defendants may
disingenuously state that they are remorseful, but suggesting that some benefit derives from
this false statement of remorse anyway).
158. Maria Glod & Michael D. Shear, DNA Tests Confirm Guilt of Man Executed by Va.,
Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 2006, at Al (reporting on executed convict who maintained his
innocence, but DNA tests performed after his death "confirmed [his] guilt").
20071 2669
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sentencing hearing is adequately served by the adversarial roles of the
defense attorney and the prosecutor. To the extent that the sentencing
hearing requires a distillation of facts, this can be done sufficiently through
the attorneys' presentations; the allocution can be considered outside of this
context.
3. Humanization Is Consistent with Participatory Arguments of Victims'
Rights Advocates
The victims' rights community already has recognized the sentencing
hearing as a key locus of storytelling in the criminal justice system, 159
especially through the codification and use of victim impact statements. 160
The desire of victims' rights advocates to have victims speak at
sentencing does not focus on the aggravation of the defendant's sentence, 161
although, in some cases, the sentence may, in fact, be aggravated.' 62
Instead, most of the arguments for victim impact statements focus on
participation in the process and validation of the individual person, not on
159. By including these arguments, I do not mean to suggest that they are correct; only
that, to the extent they dominate our discussion of sentencing, a rationale based in
humanization is more consistent with these arguments. There is no causality. Someone
might support a humanization rationale for allocution, yet believe that the same justifications
for this do not apply to victim testimony at sentencing. See Susan Bandes, Empathy,
Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361 (1996). Bandes argues that
the use of narrative has been promoted to give voice to "outsider" voices and that despite the
strong pull of narrative, victim impact narratives "should be suppressed because they evoke
emotions inappropriate in the context of criminal sentencing," thereby risking the
"sentencer's ability to perceive the essential humanity of the defendant" and can risk
offending the dignity of the victim as well. Id. at 365-66. To the extent that victims' rights
advocates have captured the public or have an intuitive emotional appeal, they have done so
with this appeal to the "individual victim" and the importance of a particular life. Victim
statements have also been criticized as potentially detrimental to the victims themselves. See
Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1411, 1429 (1993) ("Victim talk
can have a kind of self-fulfilling quality, discouraging people who are victimized from
developing their own strengths or working to resist the limitations they encounter.").
160. See Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 39, 60 n. 117 (2001) (listing statutes requiring live victim impact testimony); Douglas
E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 Cornell L. Rev.
282, 299-305 (2003) (listing state statutory and constitutional provisions regarding victim
sentencing testimony); see also Federal Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771
(2000).
161. See Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims'
Rights Amendment, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 479, 497 ("This multiplicity of reasons explains why
victims and surviving family members want so desperately to participate in sentencing
hearings, even though their participation may not necessarily change the outcome."). But see
Bandes, supra note 159, at 395 (stating that victim impact statements evoke "a complex set
of emotions directed toward the defendant, including hatred, fear, racial animus,
vindictiveness, undifferentiated vengeance, and the desire to purge collective anger");
Barnard, supra note 160, at 56 (stating that victim impact statements are "obsessive,
vindictive, and frankly unappealing").
162. See Cassell, supra note 161, at 485-86 (stating that a frequent criticism of victim
impact testimony is that it will harm defendants' rights and arguing that studies show that the
actual impact is not that significant).
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the effect on the sentence. 163 One of the reoccurring rationales for victim
impact statements and protection of other forms of victim speech or
participation is the emphasis on making the victim "real," instead of a
faceless, silent abstraction, 164
Advocates of victim impact statements also point to other, related effects.
The ability to speak has a cathartic effect. 165 Additionally, the ability to be
heard in open court about the offense and its impact is seen as part of a just
process.166  For others, victim statements at sentencing serve a
denouncement function-these statements allow for direct moral
condemnation of the defendant. 167 Finally, some have suggested that the
strong protection of victim impact statements will serve to
disproportionately benefit poor victims or victims of color that are more
likely to be shut out of the current process. 168 In many ways, these
arguments mirror those made in favor of humanization of defendants. 169
To be sure, some supporters of victim impact statements perceive that
defendants already have a complete opportunity to be heard, and that they
are merely pushing for equal treatment. An argument for victim
participation at sentencing is that victims are not seeking any "special" or
additional rights for victims; they are seeking for victims to be more equal
to the defendant.' 70 However, they assert that the victim's ability to speak
serves additional functions. Whether or not you agree with these other uses
of the sentencing hearing, 171 victims? rights advocates recognize that the
purpose of speaking at sentencing goes beyond aggravation and mitigation.
In sum, humanization theory allows for a broader range of speech to be
heard at allocution. Further, as compared to a mitigation rationale, a
humanization rationale de-emphasizes the fact-finding nature of allocution.
163. See Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim
Participation Model, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 289, 293; see also Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435
F.3d 1011, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that the statutory aims of the Crime Victims'
Rights Act include having the court and defendant hear about the human cost of the offense
and allowing the victim to regain dignity by the process).
164. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1991).
165. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Victim Impact Evidence: Hard to Find the Real
Rules, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 543, 548-49 (2003) (noting that catharsis may be a powerful
motivation behind victim impact statements); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul:
Judges, Sentencing and the Myth of the Nonviolent Rapist, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 439, 451
(1993) (stating that "[v]ictim impact statements empower the victim").
166. Cassell, supra note 161, at 494 ("Given that our current system allows almost
unlimited mitigation evidence on the part of the defendant, an argument for equal justice
requires, if anything, that victim statements be allowed.").
167. Barnard, supra note 160, at 79-80.
168. See Cassell, supra note 161, at 513.
169. Cf Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911 (2006) (arguing that victims and the public are outsiders to the criminal
process and suggesting that victims be given larger roles to bridge the "gulf' between them
and insiders to the criminal process).
170. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006).
171. See Bandes, supra note 159, at 365-66 (stating that victim impact statements "appeal
to hatred, the desire for undifferentated vengeance, and even bigotry" and "may block the
sentencer's ability to perceive the essential humanity of the defendant").
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Finally, basing a defendant's allocution in humanization is consistent with
the arguments for victim impact testimony that have been made in the
recent past to increase the victim's participation at sentencing.
B. Benefits of Grounding Allocution in a Theory of Humanization
Basing allocution in a humanization rationale has benefits for both the
defendant and other actors in the criminal justice system. First, I focus on
some of the possible benefits to the offender. Then, I examine a few
possible advantages for the court, the structure and integrity of the
sentencing process, and the public. While mitigation has support and
intuitive appeal, the benefits of grounding allocution in humanization, I
believe, outweigh the costs.
1. Benefits to the Defendant
As allocution is, at its core, a statement by the defendant, I focus first on
some potential benefits for the defendant of an allocution practice based in
humanization. There are at least four advantages. First, the defendant will
be more likely to be an actor in his own case. Second, the defendant can be
seen, through allocution, as a participant in public life, through his active
participation in the criminal justice system. Third, through a humanization
allocution, a defendant can create and express himself. Fourth, by opening
up the scope of possible allocutions, perhaps the defendant will be more
likely to explicitly choose when to remain silent, instead of seeing silence
as the default.
a. Actor in His Own Case
The mere act of talking, no matter what the content, emphasizes the
defendant's humanity.' 172 In front of the court is not only "the defendant" in
the orange jumpsuit, convicted of the statutory offense, but also a person
who can speak and represent himself to the court.1 73 Often, a defendant
will express a desire to represent himself, trying to fire his court-appointed
attorney because he believes that the attorney is not representing him in a
way that reflects his wishes or his perceptions of the case. 174  The
172. See Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 492 (Del. 2000).
173. Cf Doyle, supra note 18 (discussing the attorney's ability to re-present defendants
(my emphasis)); see also Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law
as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459 (1989) (discussing lawyers' representation of clients).
At allocution, the defendant can present himself as he chooses.
174. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right to Self-Representation: An Empirical
Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 423, 460-76 (2006) (finding that pro
se defendants chose to represent themselves largely because they were dissatisfied with their
court-appointed counsel or wanted to take an ideological position or approach that their
attorney did not); see also Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22
Law & Soc'y Rev. 483 (1988). Casper's study, which assessed "litigant satisfaction" of a
group of convicted felons, found that procedural justice, independent of the outcome, was
important to defendants. For example, one factor that mattered to defendants was the
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defendant, by being able to allocute can, at least at this stage, "have his
say." He can counter the passive role cast for him up to this point under a
plea bargaining reality. He can participate in his own case in some way,
and, because of the scope of legitimate statements under a humanization
theory, may be more likely to do so.
b. Participation in Public Life
The benefit of allocution could extend beyond the defendant's
satisfaction at being able to be an actor in his own case. Through a
humanization allocution the defendant is a participant in the public
institution of the criminal justice system that directly affects his life.
The use of stories-told in the first person-to give a voice to persons
within the legal system, particularly those who are marginalized from
traditional legal discourse, is nothing new.1 75 Allocution is a particularly
suitable place to import these ideals into the criminal justice process. The
stories that could be told-including tales about discrimination, police
oppression, desperation, economic necessity-may never fit into the
confines of "mitigation," yet they remain relevant to punishment and
important to the offender. Further, the content of the speech that conforms
to a humanization rationale is more likely to comport with the desired
message of someone who might not otherwise speak. A defendant may
choose not to express himself, but should not, at the final moment of
judgment, have to fit within a narrow category of appropriate testimony.
c. Self-creation and Self-expression
At their best, allocution stories based in humanization have
transformative potential for the defendant. Persons, through the telling of a
life story or highlighting of a life event, help define themselves and their
history. 176 A defendant could choose to speak and to have more control
amount of time their attorneys spent talking to them, a result that the authors concluded was
"consistent with the notion that procedural justice comes in part from a sense of having a
voice in the process." Id. at 498. It also reviews prior literature, drawn from different study
groups, that emphasized the importance of being heard and "voice" in a litigant's
satisfaction. See id. at 495-96; see also James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as
Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 697 (1985) ("On the
rhetorical view of law suggested here, you are entitled to have your story told in your own
language (or translated into it), or the law is failing.").
175. See Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative,
14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1, 1-2 (2000) (noting the popularity of narrative theory and
storytelling and tracing these back to the legal realists). See generally Richard Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2411
(1989) (discussing "outgroup" stories).
176. See, e.g., Karen Hirsch, From Colonization to Civil Rights: People with Disabilities
and Gainful Employment, in Employment, Disability, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act 412, 428 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) (writing, in examining oral histories and
narratives in disability law, that "[s]elf-defining narratives are ... important tools in the
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over how this important story in his life is framed. This selection of frame
not only helps the defendant to define who he is for the court, but is also a
means of self-creation. He can choose to represent himself at allocution in
a way that defines his life as a failure; he could choose to tell a story of
hope; he could choose to tell a story of innocence; or innocence lost. Each
of these narratives told at allocution can help create or recreate the
defendant's image of himself.177 In the limited time that the defendant has
to present his entire person, what is important? The defendant is forced to
think about the key moments in his life and to choose how to present
himself.
The story told is not transient. This self-created version of who the
defendant is, or wants to be, will be memorialized and transcribed with the
rest of the sentencing transcript. The transcript from the sentencing hearing
will accompany the defendant on appeal. It will often be presented at any
later parole board hearing, 178 where it may be used to determine whether
the defendant merits release. The retelling of this story contributes to the
definition of the defendant.
d. Choice of Silence
For now, defendants are choosing not to speak. If courts assume a
mitigation rationale, they will assume that the defendant's failure to allocute
means that the defendant has nothing to say to mitigate his sentence. Under
a humanization rationale, defendants could choose to represent their
sentencing stories in a less constrained way. They could also choose not to
speak, even with this broader array of permissible speech. Perhaps this
choice would be a more deliberate one.
2. Benefits for the Court, the Structure and Integrity of the Sentencing
Process, and the Public
While the focus of sentencing allocution is on the defendant, allocution
theory should also take account of the effect on the court and the criminal
justice system. It should also consider whether a humanization approach to
allocution is consistent with other aspects of the sentencing process and its
outcome. Specifically, I argue that a theory of allocution based in
humanization could have benefits for the court, the accuracy of the sentence
given, the legitimacy of the sentencing process, and the public.
process of political empowerment and in the effort to redefine the cultural meaning of
disability").
177. Cf id.; see also Michael P. Nichols, The Essentials of Family Therapy 249-61 (2d
ed. 2005) (giving a basic description of narrative therapy). Nichols notes that narrative
therapy uses the fact that "[s]tories don't just mirror life, they shape it. That's why people
have the interesting habit of becoming the stories they tell about their experience." Id. at 250.
178. See, e.g., 61 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 331.19 (West 1999) (stating that, among other things,
the parole board "shall ... consider the notes of testimony of the sentencing hearing").
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a. Court
The harms of silence extend beyond the impact on the defendant.
Without the voices of the defendants, the court risks assuming that the
defendants before it are alike despite actual significant differences. 179 The
court risks never hearing about the implications of its decisions or other
stories-such as racial dimensions to the case or the proportionality of
punishment-that might not be relevant at other parts of the trial.180
A humanization rationale attempts, as the name describes, to value the
individualization of the defendant. The court seeks to allow expression of
each defendant's humanity, and seeks to understand, over time, the variety
of defendants and their lives. 181 Having this information could allow
judges and other actors in the criminal justice system to develop a more
nuanced portrait of defendants.' 8 2 By doing so, these officials may, for
example, be better able to develop creative solutions to criminal justice
problems or to observe trends in offender characteristics or behavior.
This rationale for allocution also indirectly reaffirms the humanity of the
court and comports with current shifts in sentencing practice away from the
judge as fact-finder within a constrained guideline system and towards
judicial sentencing discretion.' 8 3 The sentencer can find mitigating facts,
179. See United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he defendant's
right to be heard must never be reduced to a formality. In an age of staggering crime rates
and an overburdened justice system, courts must continue to be cautious to avoid the
appearance of dispensing assembly-line justice.").
180. See, e.g., McKinney v. Delaware, No. CIV.A. 97-340, 2000 WL 1728276, at *7 (D.
Del. May 3, 2000) (reporting a portion of the allocution in which the defendant, among other
things, indicated that he felt "railroaded" by the imposition of a life imprisonment sentence
as a habitual offender). The defendant, McKinney, continued,
Two of my burglaries, [the] people owed me money. I went and took things from
them because they were there, and then they turn around and put charges on me
just because I live by the code of the street .... I dealt with things my way .... I
admit.., when I'm eating barbituates and drinking, I have blackouts and I have
done things. The last burglary I'm sorry for, you know, because I was in a
blackout. But the other burglaries, people owed me money, and it was over
drugs ....
But... you know, that's neither here nor there. But I'm saying I don't feel,
Your Honor, I don't feel [that] I deserve a life sentence. I see child molesters ...
getting less time.
Id. at *8 (alterations in original).
181. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[D]uring the sentencing phase of the proceedings.., the sentencer must attempt to know
the heart and the mind of the offender and judge his character ... ").
182. Cf Sarat, supra note 70, at 364 (stating that the work of death penalty defense
attorneys "is increasingly the work of recording the stories of their clients' lives, of the
poverty and abuse which breeds violence, and of the unresponsiveness of a legal order intent
on doing its own kind of violence. As the prospect of saving lives diminishes, the
importance of saving the stories of those whose lives are lost increases in importance.").
183. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text. The Court's holdings in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), did not
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presented by the defendant through allocution, to decrease the defendant's
sentence. However, the humanization rationale is equally consistent with
the sentencer's duties, and perhaps more appropriate, given the increased
discretion of sentencing courts. The court can strive to develop a fine-
grained portrait of the defendant through the allocution to help it exercise
this discretion. The judge is not merely the bureaucratic clerk of automatic
guideline systems. 184 She is also the receptor of an individual's allocution
story; a role that requires empathy, patience, and judgment.185
b. Accurate and Appropriate Sentence Given
While the process of sentencing is important, most view sentencing as a
means to an end. The hearing should result in the imposition of an accurate
and appropriate sentence. 186 Allocutions based in humanization would not,
I argue, produce sentencing outcomes that are less accurate or otherwise
inferior to sentences produced under a mitigation rationale.
One accepted measure of an appropriate sentence is whether it is tailored
to fit both the crime and the person who committed it. Mitigation achieves
this fit by the discussion of facts, including guideline factors, that give more
specificity about the offense and offender. Allocutions based in
humanization also aim to give the sentencer information about the offense
and offender, but the focus and the scope of the information presented is
shifted. 187 The humanization rationale recognizes that individuals differ
remove fact-finding from the trial court's purview, but did constrain a court's ability to find
facts that will increase the statutory maximum sentence.
184. See Tonry, supra note 75, at 48-49 ("[T]he Guidelines were too mechanical. With
forty-three levels of offense severity set out in a grid format like a road-mileage chart, and
innumerable factors warranting shifts up or down the grid, calculating a sentence resembled
scoring a loan application, and that did not feel to judges or most anyone else like a
deliberative process.").
185. For an example of a case in which, on the appellate record, the trial court seems to
ignore these requirements in the hearing of a defendant's allocution, see United States v. Li,
115 F.3d 125, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1997). The court found that the defendant's allocution was
sufficiently limited to require resentencing where the trial court, after listening to a non-
native English speaker's allocution for a "few minutes," stated "I am not going to sit here
and listen to the entire trial. You have three minutes to finish up." Id. A few minutes later,
the court ordered the defendant from the room because she reacted emotionally to the court's
termination of her allocution. See id. at 132.
186. This statement does not explicitly address the many, and sometimes competing,
goals of criminal punishment. It only recognizes that imposition of an "appropriate"
punishment-whether defined by the just deserts of the offender, the deterrent value to
others, or other criteria-is a primary goal of the criminal sentencing hearing. To the extent
that I give priority to any particular theory of punishment, my emphasis on the individuality
of the defendant devalues general deterrence and other theories that do not necessarily link
the appropriateness of the sentenced imposed on the offender to the severity of the offense
and the person who committed the offense.
187. See United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 462 (5th Cir. 1998) (contrasting the
defendant's ability to discuss whether a factual basis existed for a firearm enhancement with
the "broad-ranging opportunity to speak embodied" in the federal allocution rule); cf Haney,
supra note 15, at 1457 ("If nothing else, a judge's capital-sentencing instructions should
clearly frame the broadened scope of the penalty phase inquiry so that capital jurors
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beyond the specific facts of the offense and the defendant's prior history of
criminal activity. Allocution based in humanization more clearly allows for
consideration of the defendant's entire life and his own perspectives on the
offense. Humanization also acknowledges that sometimes punishment will
have a different effect on different people, even if they have similar crimes
and records. Humanization does not require the court to act upon these
differences; 188 it does, however, allow the judge to attempt to understand
these differences, and the opportunity to act on them.
Shaming-type punishments are one specific example of how a court
might impose, after allocution, a punishment that better fits the offender.
Shaming punishments may be on the rise or may be seen as an increasingly
viable alternative to incarceration. 189 However, they have been criticized
for their lack of consideration of the effect on the defendant's mental health
or well-being' 90 and the difficulty of tailoring an appropriate shaming
punishment for a defendant. 191  Defense counsel is one source of
information about the possible impact of a shaming punishment on the
defendant. An allocution based in humanization could also give the court
more insight into the person to be sentenced and the appropriateness of a
shaming punishment. The court, faced with a thorough allocution that
humanizes the defendant, could be more certain that punishment involving
public moral condemnation 192 or embarrassment would be acceptable to the
understand that the defendant's entire life lies at the heart of their sentencing decision....
The seemingly inexorable (and perhaps unintended) narrowing of relevant considerations to
the circumstances of the crime and little else likely stems from the relative ease with which
legislative judgments and jury decision making can be precisely focused on crime
characteristics, as compared to the more difficult, elusive, and ultimately discretionary
inquiry into the moral nature and essential worth of the person whose life stands in the
balance." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
188. The court might determine, for example, that the harsher effect of incarceration on a
wealthy offender than on a poor offender is not a legitimate ground for sentencing the
wealthy offender less severely.
189. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591,
635 (1996) (noting the increased popularity of shaming penalties, in part because they offer a
less expensive alternative to incarceration).
190. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 Mich. L.
Rev. 1880, 1920 (1991) ("A final implication of the psychological aspects of shame, which
raises both practical and fairness concerns, is the nature of the wound that shaming seeks to
inflict. When it works, it redefines a person in a negative, often irreversible, way. Effective
shame sanctions strike at an offender's psychological core.").
191. See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev.
733, 748 (1998) ("If the retributive 'bite' of shaming penalties comes from getting the
offender actually to experience the adverse and unpleasant emotion of shame, judges will
have a tough time figuring out just which offenders will have that experience (and how much
they will suffer as a result) and which will not. And they will at least sometimes get it wrong
if they try.").
192. See Kahan, supra note 189, at 646-48.
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defendant' 93 or that a shaming punishment is not appropriate given its
implications. 194
c. Legitimacy of Process and Outcome
Allowing a convicted defendant to individually "have his say" recognizes
the seriousness of the sentence to be imposed and the necessity that it be
viewed as a legitimate expression of state authority. By viewing allocution
as merely mitigation, instead of also allowing for a personal expression by
the defendant, we risk undermining the perceived sense of equity 195 and,
perhaps, respect for the rule of law. While the justness of a sentence can be
viewed from a number of perspectives, the fair consideration of the
individual before the court is, all else being equal, more likely to lend
legitimacy to the sentence that is given. 196
Further, allocution is the one place in the criminal process where explicit
criticism of the system that gave rise to the conviction is possible. 197
Incorporating into allocution the humanization stories that engage in this
criticism strengthens the system imposing the sentence and gives more
credibility to the punishment meted out without disrupting the traditional
constraints of relevant testimony at trial or discouraging the admittedly
efficient prevalence of guilty pleas.
d. Public
Allocution, while a public event, has not been emphasized as a procedure
having a significant public function. In modem sentencing, even if the
focus is on the defendant and the accuracy of his sentence, the transparency
of the process and the popular attention to criminal proceedings suggest that
the effect on the public should, at a minimum, be considered. To the extent
that the sentencing hearing is a public expression of the consequences of the
193. See id. at 642-46 (noting that the alternative to shaming is often incarceration, that
imprisonment can be much more difficult, and that some offenders would choose a shaming
punishment over imprisonment).
194. Massaro, supra note 190, at 1918 ("The signal insight from the psychological studies
of shame is that the experience is personal. People are reared differently and exposed to
different peer relationships and other personality shaping influences; as such, they
experience shame differently.").
195. United States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[A]llocution has
value in terms of maximizing the perceived equity of the [sentencing] process." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
196. Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 492 (Del. 2000) ("Put another way, allocution is
necessary because it affords an opportunity for the jury to learn about the whole person and
it bespeaks our common humanity that a defendant not be sentenced to death by a jury which
has never heard the sound of his voice." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United
States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that allocution "helps assure the
fairness, and hence legitimacy, of the sentencing process"); Nussbaum, supra note 114, at
160 ("Any fully adequate moral or legal judgment must be built upon a full grasp of all the
particular circumstances of the situation, including the motives and intentions of the agent.").
197. See, e.g., Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 130.
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offense and the sentence, allocution under a humanization theory fulfills
this goal. It allows the public to hear about the person who committed the
offense. Further, the substance of a defendant's humanization allocution
might serve other important public goals. For example, the public might
hear about the effect of punishment on the offender and his family. In
addition, the offender might choose to apologize or otherwise express
remorse or regret for his actions, allocutions that the public, in whose name
the prosecution occurs, may want to hear. Further, to the extent that
allocutions of innocence or defiance take place, these are relevant to the
public discourse on the functioning of the criminal justice system and
examination of any errors that might occur.
In sum, beyond bringing coherence to our thinking about allocution,
viewing allocution's purpose as humanization improves the sentencing
process and outcome. Among other things, it encourages the defendant to
be a full and active participant in his case and the criminal justice system, in
part, by choosing how to present himself to the court. It emphasizes the
accuracy and individuality of the sentence to be imposed by the court.
IV. RISKS OF GROUNDING ALLOCUTION IN A THEORY OF HUMANIZATION
AND THE EFFECT OF RETHINKING THE THEORY OF ALLOCUTION
In this part, I discuss some of the implications of a humanization
rationale for allocution. First, I raise and respond to a few of the possible
criticisms of a humanization rationale, namely the possibility that it is
inefficient and that it has the potential to increase disparities in sentencing
based on race or other disfavored factors. Next, I examine a few concrete
implications of a humanization theory of allocution, specifically the effect
on harmless error review of a denial of allocution and on the duties of
defense counsel.
A. Criticisms of a Humanization Model
Humanization is not perfect. Despite its significant benefits, mitigation
can more easily be defined and can better focus what can be said at
sentencing. Allocutions in humanization could expand the time spent on
allocution, slowing down the sentencing process. Additionally, to the
extent that an allocution based in humanization allows a more
individualized assessment of the offender, it makes possible distinctions
between offenders based on income, race, or other factors that may be
normatively undesirable.
1. Humanization Is Inefficient
One obvious concern of emphasizing a humanization rationale is a
potential loss of judicial efficiency. As discussed above, humanization
broadens a defendant's allocution. This broader scope might imply that
more defendants will choose to allocute or those who do will speak longer
and more in-depth about themselves. First, to the extent that this is true, it
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is a trade-off for the benefits of the rationale. 198 Any added time spent
listening to a defendant during his sentencing hearing is, I argue, worth
it. 19 9  Second, the criticism is not strong assuming current plea and
sentencing practices, which I take as given. The humanization rationale for
allocution assumes that current rates of guilty pleas will continue-it is a
way to address the loss of defendant voice within the current system. I take
this often-maligned practice as a given and thus work within a system that
recognizes efficiency concerns. Further, judges can and do place practical
constraints on allocution. For example, judges can limit the length of
allocution by balancing the seriousness of the offense and the sentence to be
imposed, the court's docket, and other concerns. The court could also limit
unduly repetitive statements or threats, for example. The statutory
protections for allocution-while generally allowing humanization-also
set an outer boundary for relevance. This could mean that the allocution
should relate to the case, the defendant, or the courts generally. These
existing limitations provide some basic contours for the length and scope of
allocution that would not be significantly altered by viewing humanization
as the goal of allocution.
2. Humanization Allows for an Increase in Racial, Class, and Other
Disparities
If the stories told by defendants at allocution are consistent with negative
stereotypes and generalizations, allocutions risk validating these opinions
and increasing racial and class disparities. For example, the sentencer
might use the ability to confer mercy to impose punishments that
discriminate based on race, gender, or class. This criticism highlights a
broader tension between discretionary systems and those in which
discretion is tightly cabined.200 In the context of allocution, stories told by
low-income defendants or people of color at a time that they are found
guilty of a criminal offense may reinforce stereotypes of poor people and
others. The sentencing story can be the client's life story. But his story is
being told at a time which may define his greatest failure or mistake.
Further, the lawyer may encourage the defendant to allocute with an
"acceptable," tried-and-true sentencing story in order to help mitigate the
defendant's sentence. This story may portray the defendant in a
stereotypical way, or may reinforce the defendant's lack of power and
influence in his own life.
198. See supra Part III.B.I.
199. See United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The right of
allocution is minimally invasive of the sentencing proceeding; the requirement of providing
the defendant a few moments of court time is slight.").
200. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of
the Federal Guidelines, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 85, 95-106 (2005) (stating that the federal
sentencing guidelines were developed to limit discretion that was exercised based on judicial
personality, geography, and the offender's race, class and gender, but ultimately concluding
that these aspirations were not attained).
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The converse also may be true. A more articulate, more educated, or
wealthier defendant may use the broad scope of allocution to his advantage.
He may better be able to portray himself to the sentencing judge and may
use language that is familiar and comfortable to the court. The extent to
which this criticism undermines the potential benefits of a humanization
allocution is uncertain. Allocution is only one component of the entire
sentencing process. Other procedural protections-the advocacy of
counsel, or constitutional limitations 201-may help to constrain the
sentencer's choice of sentence. To the extent these procedural protections
do allow discrimination, a sentencer can take cues from racial, class,
gender, or ethnic stereotypes if she is inclined to do so. This is true
regardless of the text of the defendant's allocution. As with any sentence
that allows discretion, the hope is that the sentencer can state reasons for her
decision, and, if necessary, the sentence can be reviewed on appeal. If the
defendant fully allocutes, the factors the sentencer may have considered-
whether helpful or harmful to the defendant-will be out in the open and
subject to scrutiny. In the end, the potential richness of an allocution based
in humanization may best ensure against discrimination. If a more
complete version of the defendant is portrayed, the sentencer may be more
likely to move beyond unfounded stereotypes and presentence report
summaries.
B. Implications of Focusing Allocution on Humanization
While adopting a humanization rationale for allocution would, on
balance, benefit both the defendant and the criminal justice system, and
help bring coherence to a hodgepodge of history and case law, it would
have at least a few practical implications. Here, I briefly explore two of
these-the effect of adopting a humanization rationale on the harmless error
review and the role of defense counsel with respect to allocution.
1. Harmless Error Review
A humanization rationale would eliminate harmless error review of a trial
court's failure to allow allocution. First, let me state what I do not mean.
Harmless error review would not disappear because of the nature of the
constitutional violation 202 or the obviousness of prejudice to the
defendant. 203  Instead, harmless error should not apply because it is
incompatible with the purpose of allocution. When applying harmless
error, appellate courts determine whether the mistakes in the trial court
201. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
202. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988) ("Some constitutional
violations ... by their very nature cast so much doubt on the fairness of the trial process that,
as a matter of law, they can never be considered harmless.").
203. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
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affected the outcome. 204 Mistakes that would have no impact on the
outcome-usually the determination of guilt-are harmless and are not
worthy of reversal. A mitigation theory allows the denial of allocution to
be analyzed under this framework. If the trial court denied or refused the
opportunity for allocution, appellate courts would review whether there is
any evidence in the record that indicates the defendant would have spoken
and, if so, whether he would have said anything that mattered to the
sentence given. Because of the difficulty of making a record of what the
defendant would have said and showing what the judge would have taken
into account, under this view, most denials of allocution will be harmless.
On the other hand, allocution under a humanization theory does not fit the
harmless error framework. The purpose of allocution is not necessarily to
affect the sentence given-although it will often have that consequence.
Allocution allows the defendant, through the very act of speaking and
through his words, to present himself to the court. If he chooses to waive or
curtail this right, that is his choice. But the denial of allocution by the trial
court is a denial of the defendant's ability to present himself-a denial that
cannot be harmless. 205
2. Role of Defense Counsel
Allocution should be viewed through a humanization lens that allows for
a variety of defendant stories. The stories that are told will have real life
consequences for defendants, because sentencing hearings have real
consequences, especially now with the demise of strict guideline
structures. 20 6 The humanization stories told by a defendant at allocution
could serve to lessen his sentence, by persuading the sentencer that an
appropriate punishment is less than what others might receive. On the other
204. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (requiring courts to
examine "whether the... error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict"' (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946)). See generally Jason M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm: How Tort Law
Can Help Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1053 (2005).
205. Cf Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006) (determining, under the
Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), that the remedy for failing to allow a victim to allocute
may be for the district court to hold a new sentencing hearing for the defendant in which the
victim is given the opportunity to speak). In Kenna, the testimony of the victim was before
the court in another case; the district court merely refused to allow the victim to testify again.
Id. at 1013, 1016. The Ninth Circuit noted that "[t]he court can't deny the defendant
allocution because it thinks '[t]here just isn't anything else that could possibly be said."' Id.
at 1016 (second alteration in original) (quoting the district court). It similarly protected
victims' statements under the CVRA, even if the victim testified at another hearing.
"Victims now have an indefeasible right to speak, similar to that of the defendant, and for
good reason .. " Id. The Kenna court suggested that the CRVA protects the victim's in-
court statement, whether or not it gives additional information to the sentencing court or has
any influence on the sentence given. In essence, there can be no "harmless" denial of
victims' statements. To the extent that the Kenna court's reasoning is adopted by other
courts, defendants deserve no less.
206. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
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hand, some allocution stories pose the risk of increased punishment. 207 I
have also noted that defense counsel can present evidence and argument on
the defendant's behalf, however, I have insisted that the defendant's voice
is the appropriate one for the telling of these allocution stories. An implicit
assumption, so far, is that the defendant is deciding which of the faces of
himself to present at allocution based on an understanding of the possible
effects on the sentence to be given. In order for this to be a tenable
assumption, defense counsel has an additional role to play. Part of the
attorney's sentencing representation will be to communicate with the
defendant about his ability to allocute, to discuss the allocution stories that
the defendant believes are important, and to counsel the defendant about the
possible sentencing consequences of these presentations. Nothing in this
counseling role is novel or foreign to defense counsel; but without this
advice, the defendant's choice about the story he wants to tell is uninformed
at best and illusory at worst.
CONCLUSION
Allocution is currently a mechanistic practice with little coherent
meaning. However, the history of allocution and the problems facing
modem courts suggest that a better understanding of the practice is
necessary. In this Article, I have examined two possible ways of
approaching allocution at sentencing: mitigation and humanization. As a
practical matter, most defendants will choose to present an allocution that
attempts to lessen their sentences. It will often be a defendant's best
strategic choice to tell allocution stories of mitigation. However, the fact
that the defendant will often use his allocution to tell a story of redemption,
or of remorse, or of diminished role or capacity, is not a reason to define the
practice by these choices. Modem allocution practice should be given
coherence by a theory that accounts for the entire range of stories told by
defendants prior to the imposition of their sentence and allows for broader
defendant participation. Unlike allocutions confined to mitigation,
humanization allocutions can do this. Allocution stories based on a theory
of humanization give defendants a point in the process to be heard and give
life to a historic practice.
207. See, e.g., supra notes 126-43 and accompanying text.
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